Exposé of Soviet espionage, May 1960

FREE LIBHARY OF PHILADELPHIA

[COMMITTEE PRINT]

EXPOSE

OF

SOVIET ESPIONAGE

MAY 1960

PREPARED BY THE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

J. Edgar Hoover, Director

TRANSMITTED BY DIRECTION OF

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

FOR USE OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT AND
OTHER INTERNAL SECURITY LAWS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

EIGHTY-SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
57425 0 WASHINGTON : 1960

B, Coplon - Gubitchev Case 27

C, Fuchs - Gold - Rosenberg

Atomic Espionage Conspiracy 27

1. Harry Gold 27

2» David Greenglass 29

J, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg JO

4. Morton Jobell 3^

5, William Perl 32

6. Alfred Dean Slack 32

7, Abraham Brothman 33

8, Miriam Moskowitz 33

9. Anatoli Yakovlev 3^
10, Semen Markovich Semenov J4

D, Clarence Howard Vetterli Case 35

E, Otto Verber - Kurt Ponger Case J6

F» Jack Soble Case 37

1, Jack and Myra Soble 37

2» Jacob Albam 39

J. Jane and George Zlatovski 39

4. Alfred and Martha Stern 40

5. Ilya Wolston 40

6, Mark Zborowski 41

7, Vassili Molev 42
3, Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin 42

G, Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel Case 4J

1. Reino Hayhanen 4J

2, Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel 4J
J. Roy Adair Rhodes 44

IT, SOVIET NATIONALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA
OR OTHERWISE REMOVED IROM THM.IR OFFICIAL
ASSIGNMENTS IN TEE UNITED STATES IROM

JANUARY 1, 19^0, THROUGH MAY 1, 19^ 46

A, Yuri Vasilyevich Novikov 46

3, Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov 47

C, Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev 48

D, Leonid Tgorovich Pivnev 49

E, Maksim Grigorievich Martynov $0

F, Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guryanov $0

G, Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov 5^

H. Boris Fedorovich Gladkov 5^

I, Rostislav E, Shapovalov 52

J, Viktor Ivanovich Petrov 52

K, Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov 53

L, Yuri Pavlovich Krylov 53

M, Vassili Mikhailovich Molev 5*

N, Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha 54

0, Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev 55

P, Nikolai Ivanovich Kurochkin 5^

Q» Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin 5^

R, E'vgeni Alekseevich Zaostrovtsev 57

S, Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilyuk 5^

III, INTJiENATIONAL ASPJjJCTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE

AGAINST TEE UNITmJ) STATES 59

A, Dr, Alan Nunn May 59

3. Sam Carr 69

0, Ignacy Samuel Witczak 60

D, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs 62

E, PontecorvOf Burgess and Maclean 62

SOVIET'BLOC INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

1 . INTRODUCTION:

Recent Soviet propaganda ?ia8 denounced the United
States for aerial reconnaissance of the Soviet Union in terms
designed to convince the world that the USSR would not stoop
to espionage. In discussing this subject and the reception
which President Ei senhower might expect on his visit to
Russia, Premier Khrushchev was quoted in the newspapers on
May 11, i960, as wondering what would have been the reaction of
the American people if the Russians had sent a plane over the
United States on the eve of his visit to this country.

The facts are that at the very time Premier Khrushchev
was advancing to the podium to speak before the United Nations
General Assembly on September Id, 1959> two Soviet espionage
agents were cautiously surveying a street corner in Springfield,
Massachusetts, in preparation for a clandestine meeting with an
American whom they were attempting to subvert. At the very
time that Khrushchev was declaring that a means must be found
to stop mankind from backsliding into an abyss of war, Vadim A,
Kirilyuk, Soviet employee of the United Nations, was attempting
to induce this American to furnish information regarding United
States cryptographic machines and to secure employment in a
vital United States Government agency where he could obtain
classified information for the Russians, While this meeting
was taking place Kirilyuk and the American were under observation
by Leonid A, Kovalev, another Soviet employee of the United
Nations who was conducting a counter surveillance. Unknown to
the Russians, however, this meeting was also being observed by
Special Agents of the FBI who obtained photographs of the Russians,

Not only did these RusMians stoop to spying, but they
callously abused their status as guests of this country to spy
in the most reprehensible manner — the subversion of an American
on American soil.

1 -

Although FBI Agents observed this meeting and photo-
graphed the Russians, no publicity uas given to this incident
in view of the negotiations which were then in progress. This
incident, as contrasted with the recent handling of the plane
incident by the Russians, gives ample testimony as to which
country is acting in good faith in trying to maintain world peace.

And this is not an isolated incident - nor has the
target alxmys been so limited. The facts are that Soviet agents
for three decades have engaged in extensive espionage against
this country, and through the years have procured a volume of
information which would stagger the imagination. This infor-
mation includes literally dozens of aerial photographs of major
U. So cities and vital areas which have given the Russians the
product of aerial reconnaissance Just as surely as if Soviet
planes had been sent over this country.

2. ACQUISITION OF AERIAL PHOTOGRAPHS:

In a free country such things as aerial photographs
are available to the public and can be purchased commercially.
The Sovietehave been fully aware of this and throughout the
years have taken full advantage of this free information,
collecting aerial photographs of many areas of the United States.

For example, during October, 1953> "t^wo Soviet officials
visited Minneapolis where they purchased fifteen aerial
photographs of Minneapolis and St. Paul. In October and November,
1953> 'two Soviets traveled in Missouri and Texas and obtained
aerial maps of Dallas, Tulsa, Fort Worth and the surrounding
areas covering a Naval air station, an Army airfield, and an
Air Force base. In April, 195^> a Soviet official purchased
aerial photographs of five Long Island communities. Also, in
April, 19S-^f a Soviet official purchased three aerial photographs
of Boston, Massachusetts, and Newport, Rhode Island, areas. In
^yt 195^t three Soviets traveled to California where they
ordered from a Los Angeles photography shop $dO worth of aerial
photographs covering the Los Angeles area.

However, they have not been content with acquisition
of publicly available data. For example, on May J, 195'^t
Leonid E. Pivnev, an assistant Soviet air attache stationed in
Washington, who had previously traveled extensively throughout
the United States and had obtained commercially available aerial
photographs of various areas of this country, requested a

Washington, Dc Co, photographer to rent an airplane to take
photographs of New York City which were not commercially available,
He specified the scale to be used and the altitude from which the
photographs were to be taken. He offered $700 for this activity.
Obviously the photographs which he requested would depict vital
port areas, industrial facilities, and military installations in
the New York area.

For this brazen abuse of his diplomatic privileges
Fivnev was declared persona non grata on May 29, 195^t °^
departed from this country on June 6, 195'^'

But this did not stop the Soviets^ They continued
their systematic program of collecting aerial photographs of
major cities and vital areas of the United Stateso On January 19,
1955!i ifif State Department sent a note to the Soviet Ambassador
placing restrictions on the acquisition of certain types of data
by Soviet citizens in the United States. These restrictions
were comparable to restrictions on American citizens in Russia
and in part prohibited Soviet citizens from obtaining aerial
photographs except where they "appear in or are appendices to
newspapers, periodicals, technical Journals, atlases and books
commercially available to the general publico"

Soviet reaction to the restrictions was typical of
their philosophy. They began circumventing the restrictions
by subverting Americans to purchase aerial photographs for
them. One month after the restrictions became effective,
Nikolai I. Trofimov, a Soviet official in Mexico, began negoti-
ations for a resident of the west coast of the United States
to obtain aerial photographs of 4$ major United States cities.
Nineteen of these cities are located near Strategic Air Command
bases. The remaining 26 are all strategic cities in or near
which are located air bases, naval bases, research or training
stations, atomic energy installations or important industrial
facil I ties.

During April, 195^> Vladimir D. Loginov, a Soviet
employee of the United Nations used the same technique to
obtain an aerial map of New York City. At 10 p.m. on April 26,
195^t Loginov secretly met an individual in a darkened parking
lot at the railroad station in Scarsdale, New York, where this
map was delivered to Loginov. Months later on November 1$, 195^>
this same par-king lot was again utilized by the Soviets to
obtain aerial photographs of Chicago, Illinois, On this
occasion, the photographs were turned over to Kirill S. Doronkin,
another Soviet employee of the United Nations. In this same
operation, the Soviets attempted to obtain aerial photographs of
Portland, Oregon; Seattle, Washington^ and San Diego and San
Franc I SCO, California.

574Z5 O - 60

Circumvention of the restrictions also took the form,
of trickery and deceits For example, on July 17, 1959, Viktor 7,
Fomin, assistant Soviet military attache and Anatoli G. Yasilev,
an employee of the Soviet Uilitary Attache in Washington, D, C,
obtained an aerial photograph of the Glasgow Air Force Base in
Montana from the local Chamber of Commerce by posing as
tourists without identifying themselves as Soviet officials . On
July 24, 1959, they obtained an aerial photograph of Thermopolis,
Wyoming, by bullying the clerk at the Chamber of Commerce in an
arrogant and insistent manney again posing as touristSc They
were given the photograph in spite of the fact that such a
photograph is not normally given to touristSo

It is apparent from the examples cited that the Soviet
Union reaps the benefits of aerial reconnaissance of the United
States just as surely as if planes were sent over this country.

The acquisition of aerial photographs is only one
phase of Soviet~bloc intelligence activity in the United Spates,
but the manner in which it has been done illustrates two basic
Soviet intelligence concepts^ namely, to exploit the weaknesses
of Amer icans whenever possible and to take full advantage of all
the freedoms of our democratic society^

Following these concepts, the Soviets through the use
of such devices as entrapment, blackmail, threats, and promises
have exploited human frailty^ The record is replete with
examples of such exploitation of Americans throughout the years
following the Russian Revolution in 1917o For example,
Nicholas Dozenberg, a naturalised American, first became
associated with the communist movement about 1920, In 1928 he
was recruited into Soviet espionage activities with the approval
of the Communist Party , He was recruited by one Alfred Tilton,
who was an illegal agent of Soviet Uilitary Intelligence, posing
as a Canadian citizen and in possession of a Canadian passport.
One of the early assignments given to Dozenberg was the sounding
out of other Americans for later recruitment by Tilton.
Dozenberg, after pleading guilty to violations of the passport
laws, served a term in prison in 1940 and thereafter prior to
his death cooperated with United States Government agencies.

Simon Rosenberg, another naturalized American of
Polish background, during 29JI loas sent to Russia by his
employer. While there, he met representatives of a Soviet
intelligence agency and under threats of reprisals to be
taken against his sister who was then living in Russia, he
agreed to work in behalf of the Russians upon his return to
the United States. His principal assignment in this country
was to obtain technical and industrial information, Rosenberg,
who is now deceased, also cooperated with agencies of the
Government, prior to his death, as have many other Americans
who have been involved in Soviet intelligence activity.

Another example is the case of Hafis Salich, a
naturalized American employed by the Office of Naixil Intelligence
in California who met Mikhail N, Gorin through a mutual
acquaintance in 1937" Gorin was then the Pacific Coast
manager of Intourist. By advancing Salich money, Gorin
ultimately persuaded him to furnish Office of Naval Intelligence
reports for which Gorin paid $1700. Gorin and Salich were found
guilty of espionage in 1939 and Salich was sentenced to four
years imprisonment, which he served. Gorin appealed his
conviction and sentence of six years to the Supreme Court of the
United States which unanimously upheld the conviction in 19^1;
however, the trial Judge suspended execution of the sentence and
placed him on probation provided he would pay a $10,000 fine and
leave the United States, never to return.

The decade of 1950 - 196O has been no exception. It
began with the trial and conviction of Valentin Gubitchev, a
Soviet employee of the United Nations who had obtained infor-
mation from Judith Coplon, an employee of the Department of
Justice. This conviction was soon followed by convictions of
several Soviet agents in the Julius and Ethel Rosenberg network
in 1951 > i>y ihs sentencing of Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger in
i9S3 o.fter they pleaded guilty to espionage; by the guilty pleas
of espionage by Jack and Myra Soble and Jacob Albam in 1957 <2^
later in the same year the conviction of Colonel Rudolf Abel, a
Soviet illegal agent in this country.

These prosecutions, although they clearly establish
the nature of Soviet espionage activities against this country,
involve only a part of the Soviet-bloc espionage attack which
has included numerous Soviet attempts to penetrate United States
Government agencies. For example, the prosecution of Judith
Coplon, an employee of the Department of Justice in early 1950
was followed in October, 1950, by a Soviet assignment to Boris
Morros, an American motion picture producer who was cooperating
with the FBI, to revive his acquaintance with a member of the
United States Atomic Energy Commission; to obtain compromising

- 5 -

information oonaarning thia individual} and to carefully
explore the poaaibility of placing a aeoretary in hia office
who could furniah infoimation to the Ruaaiana. Morroa
previoualy in 1948 had been given the aaaigment to attempt
to obtain information which could be uaed by the Ruaaiana in
an effort to compromiae United Statea General Clay in Germany.

Another example occurred during 1954 when Soviet
intelligence officera in Germany approached an American Army
officer atationed in Germany who waa aoon to be retired. They
propoaitioned him to work for the Sovieta after hia return to the
United Statea and aet up a achedule for meetinga in Hew Tork City.
Purauant to the arrangementa, Uakaim G, Uartynov, counaelor of the
Soviet Repreaentation to the United Nationa Military Staff
Committee, carried out a aeriea of clandeatine meetinga in New Tork
with a peraon whom he believed to be the Amy officer, Aa a
reault of hia abuae of hia atatua, Uartynov waa declared
peraona non grata on February 21, 195S»

Another example ia that of Evgeniy A, Zaoatrovtaev,
aecond aecretary of the Soviet Bmbaaay who waa declared peraona
non grata on May 13, 1959, for attempting to aubvert a State
Department employee to obtain ir\formation from State Department
filea,

A more recent example haa been previoualy cited
involving the attempt by Vadim Kirilyuk, an employee of the
United Nationa, to penetrate a vital Government agency by
tnatructing an American to obtain employment in that agency.

Soviet attempta to recruit Americana during thia period
have not been confined to attempta to infiltrate Government
agenciea. For example, in February, 1954, Igor A. Amoaov,
aaaiatant Soviet naval attache, waa declared peraona non grata for
attempting to obtain information concerning radar and United Statea
naval veaaela from a buaineaaman who had commercial dealinga with
the Ruaaiana and who waa in a poaition to obtain auch data.

In June, 1956, Ivan A. Bubchikov, an aaaiatant Soviet
military attache waa declared peraona non grata for attempting
to obtain data regarding radar, guided miaailea, jet fuela and
atomic aubmariTiea from an American buaineaaman who during World
War II had extenaive contacta with the Ruaaiana on both private
and United Statea Government buaineaa. The Sovieta attempted
to exploit hia World War II friendlineaa.

In Auguat, 1956, Viktor I, Petrov, a Soviet tranalator
at the United Nationa, waa releaaed from hia employment for
recruiting an employee of an American aviation company to obtain
claaaified data regarding United Statea aircraft.

- 5 -

4. THE INTl'lLLIGJiJ^CE ROLn; OF THt; SOVIeT-BLOC OFFICIALS

Only a few of the many examples of abuse of their diplomatic
privileges by Soviet-bloc officials in the United States have been
mentioned* In the more flagrant cases, the United States Government
has asked the offending officials to leave this country. During the
decade, 195^ - 19^0, 19 Soviet officials have been asked to leave.
Many more have been engaged in intelltgence activities throughout
the years*

The Soviet Ifiiion has maintained a large staff of officials
in this country since its first recognition in 1933* These officials
have been assigned to Soviet embassies, consulates, trade delegations,
news media, the IMited Nations, and the Amtorg Trading Corporation,
It is from these installations that the primary intelligence activities
are directed against the Ifiiited States, A former Soviet intelligence
officer who defected from the Soviets has estimated that from yC^o
to SOPjo of the Soviet officials in the United States have some type
of intelligence assignment. Other defectors have confirmed that a
high per cent of the officials are intelligence agents. As of May 1,
i960, there were 328 Soviet officials stationed in this country. They
were accompanied by 4$^ dependents, many of whom are also potential
intelligence agents.

Nor is this the full strength of Soviet-bloc intelligence.
As of May 1, I96O, there were 272 satellite officials stationed in
the United States accompanied by 435 dependents. This almost doubles
the potential of Soviet intelligence services. The satellite
intelligence services have been developed according to the Soviet
pattern, their personnel selected or approved by the Soviets and
they are trained and guided by Soviet policies and procedures.
Recent defectors from satellite intelligence services have advised
that the Soviets have access to all data obtained by the satellites
and, in fact, maintain an advisor system at headquarters level to
make certain that the satellites operate consistent with Soviet
interests.

This coordination is not limited to headquarters'
levels. Beginning in November, 195^, the Soviet and
satellite military, naval and air attaches stationed in
the United States began a series of monthly meetings under
the guidance of the Soviet military attache. During this

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initial meeting the satellite representatives were given
specific target assignments for the collection of information
desired by the Soviets and arrangements were made for the
over-all correlation of their activities.

$. INDUSTRIAL SPYING AND CIRCUIJTENTION OF REGULATIONS:

This large group of Soviet-bloc officials
stationed in the United States has systematically over the
years developed a most important part of the modern
intelligence machine which was referred to by one Soviet
official as the best industrial spying system in the
world. Volumes could be written as to the techniques
used and the ways and means developed by the Soviet bloc
to obtain information regarding the industrial potential
of the United States often with the use of subterfuge
and deceit as well as deliberate circumvention of Customs
regulations.

The following examples illustrate this
activi ty:

In 1924 the Amtorg Trading Corporation vxis
organized in New York for the purpose of acting as an
importer and exporter on the North American continent for
official trusts of the Soviet Union. Amtorg continued to
operate during World War II, although in 1942 the Soviet
Government created the Soviet Government Rirchasing
Commission in Washington, D^ C, to purchase war material.
This Purchasing Commission ivas dissolved after the end of
World War II, and its activities absorbed by Amtorg,
Since its organization, Amtorg Trading Corporation has
been staffed primarily by representatives of the Soviet
Government who have official status. Former employees of
Amtorg have advised that it was standard practice for
Soviets attached to Amtorg to request permissi on for Soviet
officials to visit industrial facilities throughout the
country on the promise of orders to be forthcoming if the
products were found satisfactory. In many instances the
officials of the companies would later be advised by
Amtorg that Moscow would have to approve the order. In
instances where a contract lias given to a particular
company, Amtorg consistently demanded blueprints of the
particular product and other data to which it was not

entitled by normal business practices. Amtorg officials
also consistently insisted on a clause in the contract
which would give Soviet inspectors the privilege of
inspecting all of the merchandise before it was shipped
to Russia.

Another device utilized by Amtorg officials was
to gain the confidence of some employee in a plant which
had a contract with the Russian Government and, through
this employee, obtain blueprints which were copied in the
Amtorg office and the copies forwarded to Russia. Amtorg
officials would also advertise for employees who, when they
appeared for an interview at the Amtorg office, would be
instructed to bring proof of their ability in the form of
blueprints of former projects. When the applicants for
employment later showed up with the blueprints, the
blueprints would be photographed and the photographs
forwarded to Russia.

Amtorg has also followed a practice of preparing
detailed catalogues concerning American industry. Congressman
Mxndt on January 29, 194^, described one of these catalogues
as "a manual for bombing America. " It was pointed out that
the book contained detailed information including many
photographs and maps of vital areas of the United States.
In this connection Amtorg Trading Corporation during the
1940's prepared a monthly magazine called "American
Engineering and Industry" and an annual guide called
"Catalogue of American Engineering and Industry. " This
latter publication in 1946 was described as a three-volume,
S, OOO-page document.

In August, 195^> Milos Frochazka, a Czechoslovakian
official assigned to the Commercial Office at the Czech
Embassy, furnished to an American the specifications for the
components of 2 steel mills to be purchased in the United
States for the Czechs. He outlined a plan whereby the American
would act as an exclusive agent to purchase these mills
ostensibly for a private concern in a Western country. He
would obtain estimates and if the estimates were approved,
the Czechs would furnish the name of the purchasing
company, a power of attorney and the necessary bank credit.
Thereafter, the mills would be shipped to the Czech agent in
the Western country and then transshipped to Czechoslovakia.

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6. EXPLOITATION OF PUBLIC INFORMATION:

It is no secret that one of the results of the
freedom of our democratic society is the availability of
voluminous information to members of the public merely
for the asking. Some of the cases previously cited clearly
indicate that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services are
aware of this fact and have taken full advantage of this
democratic freedom; however, it remains for former
Soviet-bloc intelligence officers to testify as to its
real significance and importance to the Soviet-bloc
intelligence services. One defector has stated that the
ease with which information is obtained in this country
has resulted in a reduction of the hazardous and time-
consuming clandestine operations which would otherwise
be necessary. Another has estimated that the Soviet
Military Attache's office in the United States is able to
legally obtain 9$% of the material useful for its intelligence
objectives. He stated that, in fact, 90^ of an intelligence
agent's time in any other country in the world would
normally be consumed clandestinely obtaining information
which is readily available in the United States through
Government agencies or commercial publishing houses. He
pointed out that Polish military intelligence obtains
more technical data in the United States than from all the
other countries in the world combined.

Although such information is collected in a
number of ways, the following techniques in addition to
those previously mentioned have been most productive.

One of the most useful techniques is attendance
at conventions of American organizations by Soviet-bloc
officials. During the year preceding FChrushchev ' s visit
to this country, Soviet officials alone attended
approximately JO conventions covering various fields of
endeavor including aeronautics, electronics, plastics
development, education and others^ Typical were the
activities of 2 Soviets who attended the Western Electric
convention held in Los Angeles during August, 1959' As
usual, at the inception, they began to collect voluminous
literature. When the volume became unwieldy one Soviet
left the material at a check stand and resumed his
collection activities. It was estimated that the literature
picked up by these Soviets at this one convention weighed
approximately 2^0 pounds.

10

Another technique utilized is correspondence with
chambers of commerce and industrial facil i ties throughout
the United States through which voluminous information
regarding transportation systems, major industries, etc.,
is obtained. In many instances useful maps of the areas
are also secured.

Still another technique is the subscription to
American publications and collection and review of
United States Government documents. For example, during
June, 1959> '* ""s ascertained that the personnel of the
Soviet Military, Naval and Air Attache Offices subscribed
to 44 newspapers and S^ magazines of a technical, scientific,
military and general news nature. It is apparent that the
Soviets have a definite program of subscribing to
newspapers published at or in the vicinity of vital
United States military bases.

Purchases from the United States Government
have long been a productive source for Soviet-bloc
intelligence. For example, on December 28, 19^^f the
Soviet Government Purchasing Commission in Washington, D. C,
ordered copies of 5,8l0 patents. On the same date the
New York office of this Commission purchased two copies of
18,000 patents. On January 1, 194$, the Soviet Government
Purchasing Commission in Washington again ordered copies
of 5/J^^ different patents. On January 12, 19'^5> copies
of 41, 812 patents were ordered. The next order was for
41,810. The acquisition of copies of patents has been
continued throughout the years as illustrated by the fact
that in early 1959 Anatoli G. Vasilev, an employee of the
Office of the Soviet Military Attache, requested an American
to instruct him in the use of the "Search Room" of the
United States Patent Office so that he could locate patents
in which he was interested.

The Soviets have, of course, not restricted
themselves to the acquisition of patents. For example, on
Mirch 10, 195'^> o^ Assistant Soviet Air Attache purchased
"The Pilot's Handbook" for the East and West Coasts of the
United States from the United States Coast and Geodetic
Survey of the Department of Commerce. On Mirch 12, 195^t
a chauffeur of the Soviet Air Attache purchased "The
Pilot's Handbook" for Canada and Alaska. Six days later
an Assistant Soviet Attache ordered "The Pilot's Handbook"
for the Far Fast and Europe. These handbooks contained

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57425 O - 60

diagrams of all of the principal airfields and the
approaches used in landing planes.

In April, 19$4, Soviet officials stationed
in Washington obtained from the iiip Information Office
of the U. S. Geological Survey, Department of the Interior,
topographic maps covering North Carolina, Michigan, Illinois,
Kentucky, and an area within a ^0-miIe radius of
Washington, D. C.

This collection activity has continued unabated
up to the present time. Literally thousands of similar
documents are obtained in this country every year by
Soviet-bloc officials assigned in this country and through
registered agents such as the Four Continent Book Corporation
and the Tass News Agency.

A statement of a satellite defector illustrates
the value to the Soviet-bloc of IMited States Government
publications. He stated that on one occasion, Polish
military intelligence obtained an id-volume edition
prepared by the United States Army Engineers regarding
United States port facilities. It uxis purchased from
the Government Printing Office at nominal cost, but its
estimated value to the Polish military intelligence was
placed at $$0,000.

Not content with the large volume of publicly
available material, Soviet-bloc officials have resorted
to deceit. For example, on November $, 195&> ^on
Dubesteanu, an assistant military attache of the Rumanian
Legation in Washington, !>. C, was declared persona non
grata for activity beyond the scope of his official duties.
Using a false name and identity, Dubesteanu had corresponded
with U. S. military installations soliciting material and
had rented post office boxes at North Beach, Miry land, under
assumed names to which such material was to be sent.

Reconnaissance trips by Soviet-bloc officials have
been a most productive source of intelligence. The
officials have been observed to carefully prepare for such
trips by reviewing publications collected in this country,
doing research at the Library of Congress, et cetera.
Exclusive of trips from Washington, D. C, to New Fork City,
officials of the Soviet Military Office alone took l6 trips

12

to various areas of the country in 1958 and 1959* They visited
26 states in I958 and 37 in 1959, They covered most of the
strategic areas of the country and covered some areas as many as
four times. During these trips they followed a definite pattern
of visiting chambers of commerce, driving around the perimeter
of industrial facilities and wherever possible circled military,
naval and air installations in the areas visited. They collected
all available literature and maps relating to industrial facilities,
transportation systems, power plants, dams, chemical factories,
et cetera, and wherever possible took photographs in addition to
making extensive notes,

7, mOPAGANDA AND PMiSONAL APFEARANCJUS

Exploitation of our freedoms has also taken the form
of propaganda. Not content with the distribution of over 20,000
copies of the illustrated monthly magazine, "USSi," which is in
reciprocity for distribution of a similar American magazine in
the Soviet Union, the Soviet Embassy has a carefully planned
program of distributing press releases. As of February, I96O,
the Press Department of the Soviet Embassy was distributing
press releases to almost 7,000 individuals and institutions in
the United States, including newspaper editors, business leaders,
radio stations, public libraries, television stations, teachers,
labor leaders, scientists, and leaders in trade and commerce.

In addition, since January 1, 1959 > JO different
officials attached to the Soviet Embassy have made, or were
scheduled to make, 74 public appearances (not including 7
additional invitations for appearances by the Soviet Ambassador)
before various groups in this country. Nineteen other Soviets
attached to the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, employed
by the Ifiiited Nations Secretariat or assigned to Intourist, made,
or were scheduled to make, 39 public appearances during the same
period.

These public appearances normally involved speeches or
participation in fonans on the part of the Soviet officials and
were made before various types of groups, including high school,
college, and university groups, parent-teacher associations,
advertisement and civic clubs, fraternities, professional associa-
tions or clubs, religious and cultural groups, travel clubs arid
community centers. Some of these were television appearances. It
is apparent that the Soviets are taking every opportunity to spread
the gospel of communism by exploitation of the intense desire of
Americans to learn more about the Soviet JMion,

~ 13 -

8. USE OF TfJK mTTTEn NATIONS

Attention is called to the fact that many of the
incidents and cases previously cited involved Soviet employees
of the United Nations. They are guests of the United States and
are supposedly dedicated to the cause of international peace but
they are, in fact, carefully selected envoys of the international
communist conspiracy, trained in trickery and deceit and dedicated
to the concept of fully exploiting the freedoms of the countries
they seek to destroy. It is too much to expect that they toould
not prostitute the United Nations,

Q. "TLLEGAZ" OPERATIONS

Although Soviet-bloc intelligence services have made
extensive use of their officials stationed in foreign countries
for espionage purposes throughout the years, they have, in
addition, operated a parallel clandestine espionage system knovn
as the "illegal" system. As previously noted, "illegal" Soviet
agents were dispatched to the United States as early as the 1920 's.
Such "illegal" agents have no ostensible connection with the
Soviet-bloc official establishments in the United States, but
operate clandestinely, usually under false identities, making
full use of secret communications channels and other clandestine
techniques of operation. Their dual function is to bolster the
espionage activities of the Soviet-bloc officials and to be
prepared to take over all espionage operations in the event of
war or other emergency which would cause a break in diplomatic
relations.

It is apparent that during the decade 19^0-1960 the
Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on "illegal" operations.
One former intelligence officer of the Soviet Ministry of State
Security has advised that a special directorate was created in
19^7 for the purpose of handling "illegal" agents. Another former
intelligence officer, Reino Hayhanen, has stated that he was told,
while in Moscow in 1952, that plans were being made to change over
Soviet contacts from "legal" to "illegal" operations. Another
former officer of the Soviet Ministry of State Security has
advised that as early as June, 1952> an order was sent to
intelligence agents in all western countries to prepare "illegal"
organizations which could function without interruption under
any conditions.

That this policy was followed with respect to the
United States is illustrated by the fact that in August, 195^t
a female Soviet agent attempted to enter the United States from

■^ 14 =

Canada^ at Detroit using an authentic copy of a birth certificate
previously issued to an American,. Detected by the United States
border screening process, she was refused entry ^ Less than a
year later, Rudolf J. Abel, a colonel in the Soviet Committee of
State Security, was arrested in New York City where he was posing
as an American photographer under the name Emil R. Qoldfus. Abel
had entered the United States in 19'^8 using a passport issued to
a naturalized American in IS'^? to visit relatives behind the
Iron Curtain and who never returned to this country. Abel was
subsequently convicted of espionage and sentenced to JO years
imprisonment, which sentence he is now serving.

It is interesting to note that in October, 19^2, the
Soviets sent Reino Hayhanen to the United States to act as Abel's
assistant, Hayhanen, prior to leaving Russia, had been given
instructions by Mikhail N. Svirin, a Soviet intelligence officer.
After his arrival in this country, Svirin, who had become First
Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the United Nations, met
with Hayhanen and subsequently, during the period 1952-19$3,
Hayhanen operated under his supervision. It was not until 195^
that Svirin gave instructions for Hayhanen to contact Abel and
to act as Abel's assistant.

The case involving Abel and Hayhanen is a striking
example of Soviet use of "illegal" agents against the United
Stateso In dispatching such agents to this country, we can be
certain that the Soviet-bloc intelligence services will, as
they have with their representatives who are dispatched to this
country as diplomats, take full advantage of the freedoms of
this country which are guaranteed by our Constitution.

10. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF SOVIET ESPIONAGE

The United States has not been the only target
of the Soviet-bloc intelligence organizations. Many other
countries of the world have felt the barbs of the Soviet
espionage attack. The disclosures of the Royal Commission
in Canada which followed the 194^ defection of Igor Gcuzenko,
a Soviet code clerk, revealed a Soviet espionage apparatus which
on a broad scale had recruited and subverted Canadian citizens
while seeking to infiltrate the Canadian Government and drain
off its secrets. The admissions of Klaus Fuchs in 1950 that
he betrayed the free world when, as a member of the British
Atomic Energy Team, he passed atomic secrets to the Russians
clearly indicate the Soviet designs on information in possession
of the British Government,, The flight of the British scientist
Dr. Bruno Pontecorvo in 195^ o.nd the British diplomats Guy

- 75 =

Burgess and Donald MacLean in 19^1 behind the Iron Curtain
adds additional proof. The report of the Royal Commission of
the Commonwealth of Australia in 19$^^ following the defection
of Vladimir and ffvdokia Petrov, Soviet espionage agents assigned
to the Soviet Embassy in Australia, disclosed an extensive
Soviet espionage apparatus directed against Australia. Many
similar examples could be cited to illustrate that Soviet
espionage is international in character and the expulsion of
two Soviet officials from Switzerland during the past month
clearly indicates that Soviet espionage is currently inter-
national in character.

Practically every one of the cases cited above,
although based in other countries, had ramifications in the
United States. For example, information furnished to the
Russians by Dr. Allan Minn May, who was uncovered by
Gouzenko, had been obtained when May visited a laboratory in
Chicago in 1944. Klaus Fuchs worked on atomic energy in the
United States from early 1944 through September, 19^5> ond
supplied information to the Russians while in this country.
The British diplomats Burgess and MacLean had been stationed
in the United States prior to their disappearance behind the
Iron Curtain. In spite of the use of third countries by the
Soviet Union to ccmmit espionage against the United States,
Premier Khrushchev has made strong threats of reprisal
against his neighboring countries which he assumes have been
used as bases for United States aerial reconnaissance of the
Soviet Union.

11, AIMS OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

The world-wide espionage networks of the Soviet Union
are an essential and integral part of the over-all communist
plan to completely dominate the world. However, to understand
the significance of the intelligence activity, it is necessary
to examine the basic aims and principles of communism.

The highly authoritative "History of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)" summarized the teachings
of Marx and Engels on the question of for j and violence. It
stressed that Marx and Engels taught the impossibility of
establishing a communist state by peaceful means, emphasizing
that this could be achieved only through a proletarian
revolution through which a dictatorship could be established
and all resistance crushed. V. I. Lenin gave practical
application to the teachings of Marx and Engels. Through
the application of such principles the Bolsheviks seized power

" 16 -

in Russia in 191? and under Lenin's guidance, established a
dictatorship through which all resistance was systematically
crushed^ The success of the movement led Lenin to reiterate
in later years that "The substitution of the proletarian state
for the bourgeois state is impossible without a violent
revolution. "

Joseph Stalin followed the Marxist-Leninist
principles. The Communist Party in the United States, since
it was organized in September, 'l919> and throughout the years
of Stalin's rule in Russia, was unalterably bound to Moscow.
In the earlier years. Party leaders openly, boastfully and
defiantly proclaimed their allegiance to and support of Soviet
objectives. The nature of the Communist Party, USA, was
exposed in 19^9 CLnd its leaders convicted in a court of law
where the evidence laid out before the jury constituted
irrefutable proof that the Communist Party, USA, advocated the
overthrow and destruction of the Government of the United States
by force and violence. The policies and activities of the
Communist Party, USA, have not changed to dateo The current
leaders of the Communist Party, like their predecessors,
unwaveringly follow the lead of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union,

Time and again, Soviet Premier Khrushchev has
claimed that the Soviet Union does not and will not interfere
in the affairs of other nations. Yet, in practically every
country in the world to date the Soviet Union has established
fifth columns in the form of Communist Parties which are under
the complete domination and control of the Soviets and are
sworn to uphold and aid the Soviet dream for world conquest.
Through the directives it furnishes to these subversive forces,
the Soviet Union clearly interferes with the political, social,
and economic affairs of other nations on a continuing basis in
the relentless drive toward world domination.

Today, the rallying cry of world communism is
"peaceful coexistence." However, on May $, 19^0, Premier
lOirushchev, addressing the Supreme Soviet in Moscow, paid
tribute to V. T. Lenin and stated "The Soviet people are
proud to know that the cause of our great leader and teacher
lives and triumphs and that Lenin's dreams are being translated
into reality ^y hundreds and millizAS of people--builders of
socialism and communism --and that Lenin's cause is winning all
upright men on earth." Referring to the triumph of the ideas
of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, Khrushchev toent on to reaffirm
"Marxist-Leninist ideas" as the guide to the ultimate triumph
of world communism.

^ 17 '

Thus, the fact remains that the basic principles
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, demanding the use of force and
violence , represent the guides for communism to achieve world
conquest, 27ie extensive espionage activities directed against
the IMited States which, in the past, have utilized communists
and communist sympathizers in this country as well as other
individuals who could be subverted, can be better understood
when regarded as essential tools in the relentless and fanatical
drive of international communism to conquer the world.

18 -

APPENDICES

I. CASES INVOLVING COURT ACTIONS DURING THE PAST DECADE

There are set forth hereinafter cases which have
been presented to Federal Courts in the United States during
the past ten years and which unquestionably reveal Soviet
efforts to steal American secrets affecting the national
security of this country. All these cases have withstood
the exacting test of being tried under the democratic system
of the American courts and the convictions obtained are
ample proof of the charges made.

19

57425 O - 60 - 4

A. Soviet Infiltration of the United States Government

a. Testimonu of Elizabeth T„ Bentleu

In November, 19^5t Elizabeth T. Bentl ey dis-
closed operations of two extensive Soviet intelligence
networks in United States Government agencies during
World War II. She stated the networks were under the
control of officials of Soviet establishments in the
United States and involved a number of employees of the
United States Government. She added one of the networks
was headed by Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, a United
States Government employee in Washington, D. C., and the
second network was under the direction of Victor Perlo,
also a United States Government employee.

Elizabeth Bentley fiad been engaged in communist
activities enuring the 1930s, and in 193^ became acquainted
with Jacob Golos whose true name was Jacob Raisin. Golos
was head of World Tourist, Incorporated, and utilized
that organization to arrange travel for communists and
Soviet agents. Upon instructions from Golos, a cover
agency for Soviet intelligence operations was established
under the name of the United States Service and Shipping,
Incorporated, and Elizabeth T, Bentley became an official
of that company. Under the direction of Golos, Bentley,
in 19^1, began collecting information for Soviet intel-
ligence from sources in Washington, Do Co, and her role
became more important due to the ill health of Golos as time
went on. After the death of Golos in November, 19^3:)
Bentley continued her operations in Soviet espionage, first
consulting with Earl Browder, then head of the American
Communi st Party, whom she had previously met through
Golos. The activities of Bentley consisted of collecting
information from various individuals who were employed
by United States Government agencies and the information
covered a variety of subjects including aircraft produc-
tion data, data concerning financial activities particularly
as they related to foreign commitments of the United States,
information from the Foreign Economic Administration, the j

War Production Board, the Justice Department, the Board of
Economic Warfare and numerous other sources.

20

During the course of her intelligence operations
for the Soviets, Elizabeth T. Bentley, met Anatoli B.
Gromov, First Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington,
D. C, and upon instructions from Gromov, one of Bentley' s
Soviet intelligence superiors, Bentley ceased regular
courier operations in December, 19"^- In the Fall of 1945t
Bentley had tun meetings with Anatoli B. Gromov and on the
occasion of one of these meetings he paid her $2,000 for
past services. Much of the information furnished by
Elizabeth T. Bentley has been corroborated and shows that
the Soviet intelligence service was receiving a volume of
information from persons named by Bentley from the files of
United States Government agencies in Washington, Do C. The
individuals named by Bentley, for the most part, have sought
refuge behind the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the
United States when questioned by Government investigative com-
mittees and official Government sources concerning their
act ivitieso

1 . The Case of Edward Josevh Fitzgerald

In November, 19^^, Elizabeth T, Bentley advised
that early in 19^, through arrangements with Earl Browder,
then head of the American Communist Party, she met a
group of individuals in New York City including one
Edward Joseph Fitzgerald, Fitzgerald was born in 1911
in New York City and was employed by the United States
Government from 193^ *o 19^7 in several Government
agencies.

Elizabeth T, Bentley stated that these individuals
talked freely in her presence, that there was di 3cussicn
as to the payment of Communi st Party dues to Elizabeth
To Bentley and a general discussion as to the type of
information each person could furnish, Fitzgerald, who
was at that time associated with the War Production
Board, an agency of the United States Gove'^nment,
indicated he could supply Bentley with miscellaneous
statistics that came to his attention. She later met
Fitzgerald on four or five occasions in New York City
and on these occasions Fitzgerald was acting as a
representative of the Victor Perlo group in bringing
information to Bentley.

- 21 -

Subsequent investigation of Fitzgerald
showed him to have been in contact with numerous
individuals mentioned by Bentley and also disclosed
that he was associated with other individuals who
were reported to be communists or pro-Soviet
sympathizers.

In August, 19^4, the Internal Security
Division of the Department of Justice gave con-
sideration to action that could be taken against
individuals named by Elizabeth T. Bentley under
Public Law 600, 8jrd Congress, which is commonly
known as the Immunity Act,

On September 1, 19S'^> Sdward Joseph
Fitzgerald appeared before a Federal Grand Jury in
Camden, New Jersey, and invoked the Fifth Amendment
in response to questions relating to the allegations
of Elizabeth T. Bentley. He again claimed the Fifth
Amendment before a Federal Grand Jury in New York City
on July 20, 1955' On July 29, 1955, he was offered
immunity and again claimed privilege urder the Fifth
Amendment. On August id, 1955» Fitzgerald was found
guilty of contempt in the District Court for the
Southern District of New York for having refused to
testify after having been granted immunity under the
procedures set forth by the Immunity Act. He was
given a sentence of six months and remanded to
custody in October, 195^, to serve the sentence
after refusing to purge himself of the contempt
citation.

2. The Case of William Ludwia Ullmann

Elizabeth T. Bentley, in November, 194-5,
identified William Ludwig Ullmann, a resident at the
home of Nathan Gregory Silvermaster, as one of the
individuals who was furnishing information for Soviet
intelligence. Ullmann was born in 1908 at Springfield,
Missouri , and entered the service of the United States
Government in 1935' He continued service in a civilian
capacity with the United States Government until 1942
uihen he was inducted into the armed forces. In 194-5
he was released from active duty with the rank of major
and returned to civilian service with the United States
Government until he resigned in early 194/'.

22

According to Elizabeth T. Bentley, Ullmann
brought Government documents containing data vMich,
in his opinion, would be of interest to the Soviets
to the Silvermaster home for transmittal to Bentley.
He provided himself with a camera and became pro-
ficient in document photography. Bentley advised
that Ullmann, while in the armed forces of the
United States, furnished data on aircraft production,
aircraft allocation and deployment and pertinent
developments regarding the construction, planning
and completion of a strategic-type of American
aircraft.

The investigation of Ullmann disclosed that
his contacts included many of the individuals named
by Elizabeth T. Bentley as being involved in Soviet
espionage.

In August, 195"^ » ^he Internal Security
Division of the Department of Justice gave consideration
to action against Ullmann under Public Law 600,
Eighty-Third Congress, which is commonly referred
to as the Immunity Act. On November J, iPS'^r
William Ludwig Ullmann appeared before a Federal
Grand Jury and invoked the Fifth Amendment in response
to questions relating to the allegations of Elizabeth T.
Bentley. On February 9> 1955t on order was granted
directing Ullmann to answer questions propounded to
him before the Federal Grand Jury^ After dismissal
of an appeal by Ullmann, he again appeared before a
Federal Grand Jury on March 8, 1955s orui refused
to answer questions directed to him after being granted
immunity under the Immunity Act. Contempt proceedinps
were instituted and he was sentenced on March 8, 1955*
to a term of six months in prison,. The conviction of
Ullmann was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States on March 26, 1956.

J. The Case of William Walter Remington

Elizabeth T. Bentley also identified
William Walter Remington, an employee of the United
States Government, as one of the sources of information
in the Government service through which she obtained
information for the Soviets. Remington was born

- 23

October 2^, 1917, in New York City and entered the
Government service in 193^' ^^ "^^ employed
intermittently by the Government from that date
until 19$0.

Remington, according to Elizabeth To
Bentley, was introduced to her by Jacob Golos, a
Soviet espionage agent who was one of Bentley' s
Soviet espionage superiors in the early part of
1942. During the following two years she met
Remington by pre arrangements on approximately
fifteen occasions, at which times she obtained from
him information from the files of the War- Production
Board. Bentley collected Communist Party dues during
this period from both Remington and his wife.
Remington's relationship with Bentley ceased in 1944
when Remington joined the United States Navy. The
activities of Remington as they involved his
association with Bentley were verified by Remington's
former wife.

On January 2?, 1953, William Walter
Remington was convicted of perjury on two counts and
was sentenced to a term in Lewisburg Penitentiary,
Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, after the Supreme Court
of the United States refused to review his conviction.
Remington died on November 24, 195^, at Lewisburg
Penitentiary.

b. The Testimony of Whittaher Chambers

Earlier Soviet-directed espionage which
successfully obtained unauthorized and vital information
from our Government departments, as early as the 193^'^,
was revealed by Whittaker Chambers, a confessed Soviet
agent.

Joining the Communist Party in 1924, Chambers
later became active in the Party underground in New York
City. In 1935 ^is Soviet superior, J. Peters, sent him
to Washington, B. C, to look into the background and
activities of another underground organization, or
apparatus, located there, headed by Harold Ware, and
made up of Government employees. Peters told Chambers
to find out which members of this group could keep the
Party well informed on current activities within their

24 -

respective Government departments or agencies. For
a while Chambers acted as a morale officer and liaison
man between this group and J. Peters in New York. In
late 1936 this apparatus was taken over by a
Colonel Bykov, another Soviet agent, in New York.

Its operations were focused in Washington,
Baltimore and New York. From 193^ to early 193°
Chambers received from certain members of this apparatus
important Government documents for transmittal to his
Russian superiors. Among those who contributed were
Alger Hiss, a State Department employee, and Franklin
Reno who was employed at the Aberdeen Proving Ground,
Aberdeen, Maryland. Documents would be extracted
from Government files, photographed or typed and then
returned without delay. Apartments were made available
in Washington and Baltimore for photographic purposes
and Party members schooled in photography did the work.
Chambers was the courier and sometimes photographed the
documents himself. The Soviets were constantly supplied
with current information of value to our Government.

1 . The Case of Alaer Hiss

Chambers' chief unauthorized source of
information was Alger Hiss, who for many years
advanced himself within the State Department until
he finally became Director of the Office of Special
Political Affairs responsible for United Nations
matters. He was one of the late President Roosevelt's
advisors at the Yalta Conference, and was Secretary-
General of the San Francisco Conference which organ-
ized the United Nations Organization in 194$.

According to Whittaker Chambers, all
materials received by him from apparatus members,
except Alger Hiss, were original Government docu-
ments. At first. Hiss furnished Chambers original
documents, but later gave him typewritten excerpts
and summaries of State Department documents to help
speed up operations.

25

Although Hiss has continually denied his
implication in Soviet espionage , he was tried and
convicted in IS^g-ig^O on perjury charges growing
out of Chambers' allegations of espionage and was
sentenced to a five-year term in a Federal
penitentiary.

In perjur ing himself before a Federal
Grand Jury in 19^8 he denied that he had ever
furnished Chambers any documents or copies of
documents from the State Department. He also denied
he had ever seen Chambers within the period that
Chambers alleged he performed these espionage
activities.

2. The Case of Franklin Victor Reno

In 1937 Reno was employed at the Aberdeen
Proving Ground, Aberdeen, Maryland, and in the same
year was introduced to Whittaker Chambers through a
mutual Communist Party underground worker. He
immediately fulfilled espionage assignments given
him by turning over to Chambers on various occasions
such vital information as the textbook qf the
Ordnance School which dealt with ballistics, and
mathematical data about firing tables of certain
guns, among other things.

Reno not only committed espionage but his
failure to tell the truth finally fourid him serving
a three-year term in a Federal penitentiary for
falsifying information concerning his former Communist
Party membership. This he concealed when filling
out a personnel history questionnaire at Aberdeen
in 1948.

A Federal Grand Jury indictment in 1951
charged him with making false statements to the Army
on a personnel history statement and in 195^ ^s was
sentenced as previously indicated.

- 26 -

B. Judith Covlon - Valentine A. Gubitchev Case

Judith Coplon, born in Brooklyn in 1921, obtained
employment in 194J in the Department of Justice, New York
City. In 194^, at her request, she was transferred to
Washington, D. C, where she was employed in the Foreign
Agents Registration Section of the Department of Justice.

Coplon was observed clandestinely meeting with
Valentine A. Gubitchev, a Soviet citizen employed as an
engineer by the United Nations Secretariat in New York City.
After a clandestine meeting on March 4, 194-9, in New York,
both were arrested by the FBI. In her purse at the time
of her arrest Coplon carried summaries of confidential
FBI reports to which she had access in her employment.

Coplon was tried in Washington, D. C, for
espionage and on July 1, 19^9, ^jxls sentenced to ten years
in prison.

Gubitchev and Coplon were tried in New York City
for conspiring to commit espionage and were convicted. On
March 9j ^9^0, she was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
On the same date, Gubitchev was also sentenced to fifteen
years in prison; however, his sentence was suspended with the
provision that he depart from the United States and not return.

Although Coplon' s conviction in New York was
reversed and she was held entitled to a new trial in
Washington, D. C, based en technical grounds in both
instances, it is interesting to note that Judge Learned Hand,
Second Circuit, Court of Appeals, made a statement that even
though the case was being reversed, the guilt of Coplon was
plain.

C. Fuchs - Gold ~ Rosenberg °° Atomic Espionage Conspiracu

1. Harry Gold

The FClaus Fuchs = Harry Gold treachery has
become inseparable from the history of the atomic age.
Fuchs, a German-born physicist, loas forced to flee
Germany in 1933- He went to England where he became
a naturalized citizen and was trusted with the most
vital secrets of that country. In May, 1941, Fuchs

- 27

57425 O - 60 - 5

was placed on research work on atomic energy and
almost immediately he rewarded his benefactors by
seeking out Soviet agents to whom he could and did
give important information in his possession. In
December, 194J, he came to the United States as a
member of the select British mission to carry on
further atomic research in coordination with the
Americans. Before leaving England, Fuchs had already
perfected arrangements to continue his espionage
activities in the United States. These arrangements
resulted in placing Fuchs in touch with Harry Gold,
who in turn was in contact with Anatoli Antonovich
Yakovlev, an official of the Soviet Consulate in
New York City. From early 19'^ through September,
194$, Fuchs worked with the Manhattan Engineer
District in New York and in Los Alamos and furnished
his information to Gold who relayed it to Yakovlev.
Fuchs returned to England in June, 194-6, when plans
had already been made for his future activity in
England which lasted until 1949-

On January 27, 1950, after the FBI had
informed the British that Fuchs loas a Soviet spy,
Fuchs confessed his activities on behalf of Soviet
Russia. Concerning his American contact, all Fuchs
was able to furnish was a meager physical description
and the belief that this man was not a nuclear phycist
but a person with some knowledge of chemistry and
engineering. Within four months this contact was
identified as Harry Gcldo

The search for Harry Gold ended on May 22,
1950, when he was confronted with his possession of
a travel folder and map concerning Santa Fe, New Mexico,
after having previously claimed that he had never been
west of the Mississippi River. Gold, born in
Switzerland in I9IO, had been brought to the United
States by his Russian-born parents in 1914 and he
became a citizen through the naturalization of his
father. Gold admitted espionage activity on behalf
of Russia since 1935 o.nd made available valuable
infoTTnation concerning his activities ar.d those
involved with him.

- 28

On December 9, 19^0, Harry Gold, after
entering a plea of guilty, was sentenced to thirty
years in prison and he is presently confined in the
Federal penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania.

2. David Greenalass

In May, 19-^Sr Harry Gold was given an
assignment by Yakovlev to go to Santa Fe, New Mexico,
to accept a delivery of vital atomic energy information
from Fuchs. In connection with this trip, Yakovlev
gave Gold another task; namely, to contact an American
soldier in Albuquerque, New Mexico, to obtain from
him information on the atomic bomb. On a Sunday
morning in early June, 19'^^t G^old did contact the
American soldier at the soldier's home in Albuquerque
and delivered to him an envelope containing &500, In
turn, the soldier delivered to Gold written information
regarding experiments being conducted in relation to
the atomic bomb. The two men never saw each other
again and Gold could not recall the identity of the
soldier. Based upon Gold's facts, an FBI investigation
Jed to the identification of David Greenglass as the
American soldier involved. The investigation of Greenglass
led to the uncovering of the Soviet espionage network
headed by Julius Rosenberg.

The most interesting development in connection
with the above lies in the fact that the Soviets disregarded
one of their cardinal rules prohibiting contacts between
members of separate espionage networks in using Gold to
contact Greenglass. This error cost them an espionage
network and their error was realized by them prior to
the arrest of Greenglass as Rosenberg, the head of the
network, when he learned of the arrest of Gold, gave
Greenglass and his wife ^^,000 and instructions to go
to Mexico where arrangements would be made for false
passports with xahich they could travel to Czechoslovakia.

Greenglass, born in New York City in 1922,
was a machinist who served in the United States Army
from 1943 to 19^6. He was stationed at Los Alamos
from August, 19'^t to February, 194-6.

-29'

Greenglass did not leave the country as
instructed by Rosenberg and was arrested in June,
1950, in New York City. He confessed his espionage
activities and was indicted on a charge of conspiracy
to commit espionage. He entered a plea of guilty and
after testifying as a Government witness against Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, he was sentenced
to a term of imprisonment for fifteen years.

J. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg

The questioning of David Greenglass and his
wife, Ruth, resulted in their admissions of espionage
activity carried on at the instigation and under the
direction of Julius Rosenberg, husband of David's
sister, Ethel, for the purpose of aiding the Soviet
Union. Julius Rosenberg, assisted by his wife, was
able to persuade Ruth Greenglass to induce her husband
in Los Alamos in 19^4 to make available secret data
concerning atomic energy research which was available
to him in his position. Subsequently, Greenglass
furnished valuable and secret information both to
Harry Gold and to Rosenberg concerning the developments
at Los Alamos.

In addition to the atomic energy information,
Rosenberg had other espionage objectives. Max Elitcher,
an employee of the Bureau of Ordnance, Navy Department,
from 193° ^° 19'^d, stated Rosenberg, on approximately
nine occasions, attempted to persuade him tc turn over
material and drawings handled by Elitcher in his work.
Greenglass told of Rosenberg 's boast to him that he
once took the entire proximity fuse out of a New York
City plant where he was stationed as a Government
inspector. Rosenberg also told Greenglass he had
learned of a "sky platform" on which the United States
Government was working. He said the idea was to create
a platform at a point in space where gravity ceased
to exist, perhaps $,000 miles above the earth.

Julius Rosenberg was arrested July 17, 1950,
and his wife was arrested August 11, 195^, and both
were charged with conspiracy to commit espionage. The
trial of the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell was held in
March, 1951 1 a^ which time they were found guilty. The
Rosenbergs were sentenced to death in April, 1951> ci^
were executed on June IQ, 1953'

- 30 -

Between the time of the sentence and the
execution the Rosenberg case, in one form or another,
loas before the United States District Court on sixteen
occasions, before the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals on nine occasions, before the United States
Supreme Court on nine occasions and there were two
applications for executive clemency.

4. Morton Sobell

The espionage activities of Morton Sobell
rose as a result of disclosures made by Max Elitcher
concerning the Rosenberg network. He advised that
when he was approached by Rosenberg, a former college
classmate, and requested to obtain information for
transmittal to Russia, Rosenberg told him that Sobell
was either working or cooperating with him in his
activities. Later, Elitcher repeated this statement
to Sobell which caused Sobell to become quite angry
and to remark that Rosenberg should not have mentioned
his name. Further, after Sobell moved to New York City
in 1946 or 19^7 i ^e was instrumental in arranging
further meetings between Rosenberg and Elitcher and,
in doing so, indicated his knowledge of the fact that
Rosenberg wanted to discuss with Elitcher the matter
of his furnishing information to the RussiaTis. Also,
in July, 19^, Elitcher accompanied Sobell in his car
on a trip to the lower east side of New York in the
vicinity of the Rosenberg apartment. Sobell left
Elitcher in the car for approximately fifteen minutes
and on his return indicated he had delivered a 'can'
to Rosenberg, and Sobell described its contents as
'good material.'

An investigation was instituted and showed
that Morton Sobell had failed to return to his place
of employment after June 16, 1950, the day of the arrest
of David Greenglass. It was determined Sobell and his
family left New York City by airplane on June 23, 1950,
and proceeded to Mexico City. While in Mexico, the
Sobell family lived under assumed names and corresponded
with their relatives in the United States through a mail
drop. Sobell was arrested in Mexico City by Mexican
security police and was turned over to the FBI at Laredo,
Texas, He was indicted and tried with the Rosenbergs,
On April 5$ 1951> ^e ^^^s sentenced to a term of thirty
years. He participated in the Rosenbergs' appeals and
since their execution appealed his case to the Supreme
Court twice with negative results,

- 31 -

f. William Perl

William Perl, bom in New York City in I918, was
a classmate of both Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell at
college. He worked for the National Advisory Committee for
Aeronautics at Langley Field, Virginia, and Cleveland, Ohio,
after his graduation. It was learned that Sobell maintained
close touch with Perl through correspondence after their
graduation from college.

Perl admitted that in July, 19$0, a girl he
recognized to be a former girl friend of a close friend of
his visited him in Cleveland. He said that she explained in
writing that a stranger instructed her to proceed from New York
City to Cleveland to deliver a message to an aeronautical
engineer. She wrote out the instructions for him to leave the
United States and flee to Mexico. She mentioned the name
"Rosenberg." This girl was located and on interview verified
the above information and stated that Perl refused to accept
the sum of ^2,000 which she offered to him.

Perl was called to testify before a Federal Grand
Jury and denied that he had been acquainted and associated
with Julius Rosenberg and Morton Sobell, He loas found guilty
on two counts of perjury concerning his denial of knowledge of
Rosenberg and Sobell. On June S> ^9S3> 'i* w*® sentenced to
serve five years on each count to run concurrently,

6. Alfred Dean Slack

Harry Gold voas thoroughly interviewed for information
about his espionage associates and contacts. He told of his
first meeting Alfred Dean Slack on the instructions of his then
Russian superior in September, 19^0. In meetings occurring
between 1940 and 19^2, Slack furnished information from the
files of Eastman Kodak and concerning the making of nylon. Fate
came to the assistance of Gold and his Soviet network when in
September, 19^-2, Slack was transferred to the Holston Ordnance
Works, Kingsport, Tennessee, In about April, 194A, Slack
turned over to Harry Gold the formula for and a sample of RDX,
a secret and powerful explosive being manufactured at the
Holston Works.

Slack was bom in Syracuse, New York, August 6,
190^, of American-bom parents. When interviewed in June, 1950,
he related his original recruitment by his brother-in-law,
Richard Briggs, a research chemist, and his furnishing information

- 32 -

to the Soviets through Briggs shortly after 193^- ^^ first
he believed the information loas used by Briggs for business
purposes; however, later Briggs told Slack that he was passing
the information on to the Russians, specifically one "George."
Slack later met George and on the death of Briggs in 1939 > ^«
continued supplying information to George, who was identified
by Slack as Gaik Ovakimian, a Russian arrested in New York City
in May, 1941, for violation of the Registration Act. Ovakimian
was allowed to leave the United States in July, 1941. Slack
admitted his contacts with Gold and the handing over to Gold of
the formula and sample of RDX, a military explosive.

After pleading guilty to a charge of conspiracy to
commit espionage. Slack was sentenced in September, 1950, to
serve fifteen years in a Federal penitentiary.

7. Abraham Brothman

8. Miriam Moskowitz

Abraham Brothman first came to the attention of the
FBI when, as a result of the disclosures of Elizabeth Bentley,
it was learned that in 1940 she had been introduced to
Brothman by Jacob Golos. Thereafter, she contacted Brothman
on about ten occasions receiving from him various blueprints
and documents for delivery to Golos. She last contacted him in
late 1940 and gave him specific instructions on meeting his new
Soviet contact whose identity she did not know.

Harry Gold, after his arrest, admitted that under
the instructions of Semen Semenov, his Soviet superior, he
contacted Brothman in New York City in September, 1941. He
stated thereafter he obtained blueprints, documents and other
information of a commercial, industrial nature for transmission
to the Soviets.

On interview in May, 1947, Brothman furnished to the
FBI fabricated information to the effect that he met Gold through
Jacob Golos, then deceased. Immediately following the interview,
he furnished Gold the substance of the statements he made and
requested Gold to use a similar story. Brothman testified along
the same line before a Federal Grand Jury in July, 1947, and
when Gold later received a subpoena to testify before the same
Grand Jury, Brothman spent two hours reviewing with Gold the
details of his testimony to assure that their stories would
coincide. Brothman and his business partner, Miriam Moskowitz,
loere indicted on a charge of conspiracy to obstruct and impede

- 33 -

the administration of justice. Both were convicted. Brothman
was sentenced to two years imprisonment and $10,000 fine on one
count and five years and ^^,000 on the second count. Moshowitz
received a sentence of two years and ^10,000 fine. On appeal
the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed Brothman' s conviction on
the count carrying the five year sentence on the grounds that
venue did not lie in the Southern District of New York. The
conviction of Moshowitz was upheld.

9. Anatoli Antonovich Yahovlev

Yakovlev entered the United States in February, 19"^!,
and assumed his duties as a clerk at the Soviet Consulate in
New York City. From the first part of 1944 through late 19^5
he directed the activities of Harry Gold and received from him
all the atomic energy information turned over by Fuchs in the
United States. It is interesting to note that in July, 19'^^>
upon his return from a two-month trip to Moscow, he was made
vice consul of the Soviet Consulate in New York City. He left
the United States in December, 1946. He was named as a
coconspirator and codefendant in the Rosenberg-Sobell indictment;
however, he has not returned to the United States and has not
been tried.

10. Semen Markovich Semenov

Semenov was the espionage superior of Harry Gold
during the period from 1940 through 19-^3- ^^ first entered the
United States in 193^ ^^'^ attended Massachusetts Institute of
Technology where he obtained a masters degree in science in 1940.
In July, 1941, he was designated as an official of Amtorg
Trading Corporation, New York City. He left the United States in
September, 1944.

.34 -

S, Clarence Houard Vetterli Case

Igor Gouzenko, Code Clerk for the Soviet Military
Attache, Ottawa, Canada, from the summer of 19^3 until his
defection to Canadian authorities in September, 19^5> revealed
that in August, 194$, Moscow had instructed the Soviet
Military Attache in Ottawa to obtain a Canadian passport
for a Soviet agent then residing in Los Angeles, California,
under the name Ignacy Samuel Witczak. Gouzenko stated that
Witczak's function in this country was to operate a netvoork
of Soviet agents in the event Soviet diplomatic establishments
were no longer available due to a break in United States -
Soviet diplomatic relations.

The true identity of Soviet agent Witczak has
never been established. He used the passport and assumed
the identity of a naturalized Canadian of the same name
who had been born in Poland. The real Witczak had served
with the Loyalists in Spain during the Spanish Civil War.
He alleged that his Canadian passport had been taken from
him upon his arrival in Spain and that it lojs subsequently
reported to have been destroyed.

The Soviet agent Witczak entered the United States
in 1933 and studied at the University of Southern California.
In 1945 ^e "OS Assistant Professor in the Political Science
Department at that University. On November 21, 1945, he
disappeared.

Investigation established that Soviet agent Witczak's
most intimate associate in the United States was Clarence Howard
Vetterli who appeared to be cognizant of Witczak' s activities.
Vetterli was used by Witczak for the purpose of contacting
various individuals. On May 25, 194-9, Vetterli was brought
before a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, and denied any
part in Witczak' s intelligence activities. Based on his
denials he was indicted and convicted on two counts of perjury
and sentenced to si:x years imprisonment on July 25, 195^' -^'s
conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals,

On November 10, 1952, the United States Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case fo the United States District Court for
resentencing of Vetterli. He was resentenced on February 2,
1953> io a total of si-x years to be reduced by the time
already served in custody of the Attorney General.

-35 -

D> Otto Verber - Kurt Ponger Case

Otto Verber and Kurt Ponger, his brother-in-law,
were naturalized American citizens and were members of the
United States Armed Forces during World War II. Upon
their discharge from the Army after World War II they
remained in Germany and accepted civilian employment in
connection with the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials, They
were recruited by the Soviets to act in an espionage
capacity against the United States Army establishment
in Vienna, Austria, and were instructed to secure infor-
mation concerning United States installations and
personalities. They recruited an American employee of the
United States Air -Force in Vienna who was operated as a
double agent against the Soviets by the United States Army,

The double agent returned to the IMited States
and as a result of instructions from Ponger and Verber he
was placed in contact with Yuri Novikov, Second Secretary
of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D, C, Novikov met with
the double agent on ten different occasions in Washington,
Do C, or the immediate vicinity. The last meeting took
place on April 22, 19^2, At some of these meetings Novikov
accepted information from the double agent, some of which
was of a classified nature^ Novikov showed a definite
and particular interest in the sources of information
utilized by the intelligence agencies of the United States
Military establ ishment. He also indicated a desire for
data concerning the operations of the United States Armed
Forces in Europe and data possessed by the Air Force
relative to vital installations such as railroad, air
fields, heavy industry, etc, in the Soviet Union, He also
expressed interest in information concerning the intelligence
set-up of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
On January 14, 19S3> ^^^ United States State Department
declared Yuri Novikov persona non grata for his activities
in this case and Novikov departed for the Soviet Union
on January 19, 1953'

Verber and Ponger, the original principals in
this operation, were brought back to the United States and
pleaded guilty to espionage charges. On June 8, 1953*
Verber was sentenced to a term of not less than three years,
four months or more than ten years and Ponger was sentenced
to a term of not less than five years or more than fifteen
years,

- J6 -

F. Jack Soble Case

In the early 19^0' s the FBI was conducting an
intensive investigation into the activities of Vassili
Zubilin (true name, Vassili Mikhailovich Zarubin) , Third
Secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C, Zubilin
had entered the United States on December 25, 1941, with
his wife, Elizabeth, and son, Peter. The investigation
disclosed that Zubilin had been an important Soviet intelli-
gence agent for many years. During 1934-1937 he was in the
United States on several occasions utilizing an American
passport fraudulently obtained under the name of Edward Joseph
Herbert,

The first break in the FBI investigation came when
in the Spring of 1943r Zubilin, while under physical
surveillance by the FBI, was observed to contact Boris Michael
Ikirros, a motion-picture producer in Hollywood. After
extensive investigation into the activities of Miorros, he
was interviewed by the FBI in July, 1947, and admitted he
was recruited by Zubilin for Soviet intelligence activities.
Morros, thereafter, agreed to operate as a double agent
against the Soviets under the direction of the FBI. Thus
began an operation of intrigue which led to the expose of a
Soviet espionage ring in New York City culminated by the
arrest on January 25, 1957 1 ^y ^^ Agents of Jack Soble,
Myra Soble and Jacob Albam on charges of conspiring to
commit espionage. In addition, the FBI investigation
resulted in identifying as Soviet intelligence agents, Jane
and George Zlatovski , who were indicted on July a, 1957r
charged with espionage conspiracy; Alfred and Mirtha Stern,
who were indicted on September 9, 1957* on two counts
charging espionage conspiracy; Ilya Wolston, who was
charged with contempt for failing to appear before a grand
jury and on August 7> 195^> pleaded guilty in the Southern
District of New York; ISark Zborowski, who was indicted for
perjury on April l8, 195^> <^s a result of his denial before
the Federal Grand Jury that he knew Jack Soble; and Vassili
liolev, an official attached to the Soviet Embassy, Washington,
D. C, who was declared persona non grata, January 25, 1957'

1 , Jack and M/ra Soble

Jack Soble entered the United States in 1941 as
a Lithuanian refugee and in 1947 became a United States
citizen by naturalization. As early as 1944 Soble

- 37 '

participated with other Soviet agents in the operation
of a business concern organised to serve as a "cover"
for Soviet agents. This was the Boris Morros i&isic
Company with offices in New York and Los Angeles. In
December, 1943> Vassili Zubilin introduced Morros to
Alfred K. Stern and his wife, Mirtha Dodd Stern, at
which time it was agreed Stern would invest $130,000
in Morros' business, becoming an officer, and learn the
business. This arrangement was consummated in early
1944. Shortly after the agreement was made between the
Sterns and Morros, Zubilin advised Morros that he was
leaving the United States and introduced Morros to
Jack Soble, a resident of New York City. Zubilin
instructed that Soble was thereafter to act as Morros'
and Stern's superior.

Soble supervised activities of Soviet agents
both in the United States and Hurope; assigned them to
recruit U, S. Government employees stationed abroad,
to obtain information concerning military equipment
and supplies; and has claimed to have obtained infor-
mation concerning the number of atomic bombs stockpiled
in the United States and the rate of atomic bomb production
as well as photographs of atomic "bunkers" in which bombs
were stored.

His wife, Myra Soble, also a Lithuanian refugee,
assisted him in his espionage operations.

Jack and Myra Soble were arrested by FBI Agents
on January 2$, 1957* <^^ were indicted on February 4, 1957*
on five counts charging espionage, conspiracy and violation
of the Registration Acts. On April 10, 1957> they pleaded
guilty to count two of the indictment which charaed
violation of Section 793t Title id, U. S. Code (commonly
referred to as the peace-time e:spionage Statute) which
carriea a maximum prison sentence of ten years. On
August 9t 1957> Myra Soble was sentenced to five and
one-half years in Federal prison and the other counts
of the indictment were dismissed as to her. On October 8,
^957i Jack Soble was sentenced to seven years imprisonment.
At that time Myra Soble' s sentence voas reduced to four
years. The other counts of the indictment were dismissed.

.38 -

2. Jacob Alham

Jacob Albam, associated with the Sobles in
the espionage conspiracy, is also a native of Lithuania,
His application for U. S. citizenship in 1951 ^s "o*
been granted. Jacob Albam first came to the United
States in 19^7 on a visitor ' s visa from France. Soble
had an assignment from the Soviets to obtain an American
woman for Albam to marry and to set Albam up in business
in the United States. Albam lazs married to an American
woman in the Spring of 19^8 and returned to France, later
re-entering the United States as an immigrant husband
of an American citizen and subsequently applying for
American citizenship. He purchased an interest in a
business in New York which later went bankrupt and
subsequently he was employed by his brother who operates
a business in New York City.

Albam has been described as a specialist in
handwriting, "copying" and photography. When contacted
in 1955 by Boris Morros, Albam acknowledged the code
name assigned by his Soviet supervisors, admitted receipt
of money to establish himself in this country and agreed
to take further Soviet instructions*

Albam was also arrested on January 25, 1957>
and indicted on the same charges and on the same date
as the Sobles. He pleaded guilty to count two of the
indictment on February 26, 1957- On August 9» 1957*
he was sentenced to five and one-half years. The other
counts of the indictment against Albam were dismissed.
On October 8, 1957> Albam' s sentence was reduced to
five years*

3* Jane and George Zlatovski

Jane and George Zlatovski, American citizens
currently residing in France, served under Jack Soble' s
supervision from 1945 to 1951- In a report intercepted
by Boris iiorros, Jane Zlatovski claimed that while
employed by the U. S. Army in Austria in 19^7 - 19^8,
she obtained through her Army employment names, photographs
and biographies of agents of the Counter Intelligence
Corps and the Central Intelligence Agency, similar infor-
mation concerning their "native agents" and "practically
every scheme they hatched." Only disruption of contact

- 39 -

with her superiors prevented successful delivery of
such information to the Soviet Intelligence Service.

Jane and George Zlatovski were indicted on
July 8, 1957' ^c indictment contained two counts
charging both with espionage conspiracy similar to
the Soble indictment. The Zlatovskis were not arrested
inasmuch as they reside in France and efforts to effect
their return from France to date have been unsuccessful.

4. Alfred and Mxrtha Stern

The Sterns are both American-born citizens.
They were originally identified as Soviet agents by
Boris Morros in July, 194^, when he reported that they
had participated with him and Vassili Zubilin in the
establishment of a business concern (the Boris Morros
Music Company) which was to be used as a "cover" for
Soviet intelligence agents. It was agreed that Stern
would invest ^f JO, 000 in Morros' business, become an
official and learn the business. Since Jack Soble
pleaded guilty, he has confirmed that the Sterns were
Soviet agents.

When the Soble s and Albam were arrested on
January 25, 1957* "t^e Sterns were residing in Mexico
City. They were subsequently served with subpoenas
calling for their appearance in New York City before
the grand jury hearing the Soble case. They refused
to honor the subpoenas and on Mjy 1, 1957> they were
fined $25,000 each for contempt. On the following
date warrants were issued for their arrest, as material
witnesses. They were indicted on September 9> 1957* on
two counts charging espionage conspiracy and one count
charging general conspiracy. The Sterns were not
arrested inasmuch as they fled from Mexico to
Czechoslovakia clandestinely in July, 1957'

5. II va Wolston

Wolston was born in Russia. He entered the
United States on April JO, 19J9' Se was naturalized
a United Stales citizen on May l8, 194J. In 1942 -
1946 he served in the U. S. Army, in 194J attending
the U, S. Army Intelligence School at Camp Ritchie.

- 40 -

On several occasions beginning May y, 19S^r
Jack Soble furnished Boris Morros with information
concerning an individiml he described as a U.S. Army
Colonel in Germany who furnished him information under
the code name "Slava, " which was very valuable to the
Soviets. It is noted that from October, 19^9t until
July, 19^1 f Wolston was employed by the U.S. High
Commissioner of Germany in Berlin. In January, 1955 1
Soble identified his nephew, Ilya Wolston as "Slava."
In addition. Jack Soble, pleading guilty in April,
1957 > furnished information identifying Wolston as a
Soviet agent who provided him information for the
Soviets on several occasions beginning when Wolston
was in a military camp, aboui 194J. Soble said Wolston
gave him information concerning his assignments and
names of four persons at the camp whom he believed could
be approached by the Soviets.

Information concerning the probable identifica-
tion of Wolston as a Soviet agent was furnished to the
Department of State in 195^f together with data developed
concerning his black market activities in Germany. The
Department of State, on the basis of these data, dismissed
Wolston from his employment in Berlin.

On August IJ, 195^> Wolston was sentenced to
one year's imprisonment for contempt for failure to
appear before a Federal Grand Jury in July, 1958. The
sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years'
probation conditioned on his being available to process
of the court within the three-year period.

Mark Zborowski

Zborowski was born in Russia and became a
naturalized U. S. citizen in New York City in June, 194'p.
Zborowski was employed as a language consultant in 19^3-
1944- by the War Department in New York City. Jack Soble
advised that Zborowski acted as a Soviet agent under his
supervision during the approximate period 194J-1945t
furnishing information concerning Trotskyites and other
anti-Stalin elements. Zborowski denied knowing Soble
before a Grand Jury in February and March, 195? t ond in an
interview August 11, 1957* However, when confronted by
Soble on August 7, 1957 > ^^ admitted Soble had been
one of his espionage superiors.

Zborowski was indicted for perjury April I8, 195^)
was found guilty after trial on November 20, 1953, and on
December 8, 195^, loas sentenced to five years' imprisonment.
On November 10, 1959) the Court of Appeals reversed the
conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

- 41 -

7. Vassili Molev

Vassili Molev, while attached to the Soviet
Delegation to the United Nations, New YorK City, in 19S3
(handling maintenance, purchase of supplies and similar
matters) met Boris Morros on a date and at a time and place
previously designated by Morros' Soviet intelligence
superiors in Austria, Molev accepted from Morros a report
prepared in New York by Jack Soble and given by Soble to
Morros in accordance with instructions from their Soviet
superiors. Photographs, both still shots and motion
pictures, of this meeting were taken by FBI personnel.

Immediately following the arrest of Jack Soble
on espionage charges on January 2$, 1957> ^^^ ^* ^'
Department of State declared Molev persona non grata.
Molev at that time was employed (in a similar capacity)
by the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D.C. He left the United
States on January 2a, 195? t «" route to Russia.

8. Mikhail Nikolaevich Svirin

Mikhail Svirin, a Soviet assigned to the Soviet
United Nations Delegation, New York City, from August, 1952,
to April, 195^i ^■oas identified by Yuri A. Rastvorov, a
former Soviet intelligence officer, as a member of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and a very experienced
intelligence officer.

On two occasions in January and February,
J-953> Svirin was observed in the area where Boris
Morros was scheduled to meet with his Soviet superior,
Morros subsequently met Vassili Molev on March J, 19S3*
at the scheduled meeting place.

Reino Hayhanen, former illegal Soviet
intelligence agent, advised he first met Svirin in
Moscow when Hayhanen returned from Finland in 19$2,
Just prior to being dispatched to the United States
as an illegal agent. After his arrival in this
country he met Svirin on two occasions during the
period 1952-195^ and ultimately Svirin arranged for
him to meet Rudolf Abel, another Soviet illegal agent.

Svirin also served as an employee of the
United Nations Secretariat from September, 19^4, until
October 24, 1957, when he last departed from the United
States.

- 42 -

g. The Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel Case

1. Reino Hauhanen

On May 6, 1957, Reino Hayhanen, a Soviet citizen,
walked into the American Embassy in Paris, France, and advised
that he uoas a Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet State Security
Service and had been involved in Soviet espionage in the
United States for the past five years. He had in his
possession an American passport issued in the name of Eugene
Nicolai Mahi, bom May JO, 1919, Enaville, Idaho. He advised
he had been assigned in the United States (1) to locate possible
recruits for Soviet espionage, (2) to obtain information about
new military installations in the United States, and (3) to
check up on certain individuals who were of interest to Soviet
Intelligence. He had been unsuccessful and then laas ordered to
return to Moscow. At the time of his appearance in Paris, he
was on his my to the Soviet Union but was afraid to return
because of possible measures the Soviets might take against
him for his failure. On May 10, 1957, Hayhanen was returned
to the United States by plane at his own request.

Hayhanen revealed he had been drafted into the
NKVD in 1939. Following initial training and experience
along the Finnish border, he was ordered to Moscow in 1948
for assignment with the "illegal" or "deep cover" section
of the Soviet State Security Service. There he was given the
name of Eugene Maki {American-born of Estonian parents who
had been returned as a child to Estonia) and briefed for
assignment in the United States. To perfect his "legend" (false
background) he went to Estonia and then to Finland under his
assumed name and identity. Having learned the English language
and American customs and been trained in surveillance, secret
writing, coding and the preparation of microfilm, he arrived
in the United States October 21, 195^'

2. Colonel Rudolf Ivanovich Abel

During Hayhanen's assignment in the United States,
he had two Soviet principals. The identity of his first
principal (I952-I953) was established as Mikhail Nikolaevich
Svirin, First Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the
United Nations in 1952-1953 and later Assistant to the Assistant
Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1954-1956.
Hayhanen knew Svirin only as "Mikhail Ivanovich. " His other
superior in the United States (1954-1957) "ws a colonel in the

- 43 -

Soviet State Security Service he knew only as "Mark."
Investigation subsequently identified "Mark" as Ehiil R.
Goldfus, who maintained a photographic studio in Brooklyn^
New York.

Based on information furnished by the FBI, Goldfus
was apprehended June 21, 195? t ^V ^^* Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service at a hotel in New York City where he was residing
under the name of "Martin Collins," and charged with illegal
entry into the United States, He claimed his true name to be
Rudolf Ivanovich Abel, Soviet citizen. On August 7, 1957* ^^
was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury in New York on two counts
of espionage conspiracy and one count charging him to be an
agent of a foreign principal without notification to the Secretary
of State. On October 2$, 1957, Abel was found guilty on all
counts and on November 15, 1957t foas sentenced to a period of JO
years on the first count, 10 years and a $2,000 fine on the
second count, and a $1,000 fine on the third count, sentences to
run concurrently as to confinement and consecutively as to fines.
Abel's conviction was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals on July 11, 1958. Bis conviction was also affirmed by
the United States Supreme Court on March 28, 196O.

Methods used by Hayhanen and Abel in their contacts
toere ingenious. In order to contact his superiors, Hayhanen
would place chalk marks at various predesignated points. To
minimize personal contacts and subsequent danger of compromise
by surveillances, a system of widely separated "dead drops"
or "banks" was established throughout the metropolitan area
of New York. These drops were located in such places as
Prospect Park, Riverside Drive, Fort Tryon Park, and Central Park,
Use was made of hollowed-out coins, bolts. Jewelry, magnetic
containers, and other objects in u^ich xoould be inserted
film containing code or plain text messages and other material
for transmittal.

?. Rou Adair Rhodes

One of Hayhanen' s assignments in the United States
was to locate an American Army Sergeant by the name of "Quebec"
uho had been recruited by the Soviets while assigned to the
American Embassy in Moscow in 195^- Investigation identified
"Quebec" as Master Sergeant Roy Adair Rhodes. The latter has
admitted his recruitment stating he had been compromised through
a Russian girl in Moscow with it^om he had an affair. He stated
he was in contact with the Soviets in Moscow for approximately
two years but had furnished no information of value to them.

- 44 -

Upon hia return to the United States in 19S3 'i* severed contacts
with the Soviets. Rhodes was tried by a United States Army Court
Martial on charges of conspiracy to commit espionage and signing
a false loyalty oath. He was found guilty and on February 21,
19^8, was sentenced to five years and a dishonorable discharge.
He appealed his conviction to the Board of Review, United States
Army, which approved the sentence imposed on Rhodes.

.• 45 -

II. SOVIET NATIONALS DECLARED PERSONA NON GRATA
OR OTHERWISE REMOYED FROM THEIR OFFICIAL
ASSIGNMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES FROM
"JANUARY 2, 1950, THROUGH ZdAY 1 , i960

The Soviet Union speaks of "peaceful coexistence* "
Its leaders refer to Americans as "capitalist warmongers, " to
our Government as "imperialistic, " our actions as a threat to
world peace. Khrushchev has made much of our attempts to
determine the existence and location of Soviet intercontinental
missile bases, offensive weapons of war concealed behind the
Iron Curtain of Soviet secrecy. With irresponsible exaggera-
tions he has attempted to portray the United States as an
aggressor nation.

In contrast to such irresponsible statements has been
the carefully considered action of the United States in those
instances in which Soviet officials in this country, under
cover of diplomatic immunity or official status, have engaged
in aggravated acts of espionage.

Among the numerous incidents of Soviet espionage
during the past decade the United States has been forced to
officially request the withdrawal of 19 Soviet officials
because of their participation in espionage operations or other
action completely incompatible with their continued presence in
this country.

Though such action has been essential to national
dignity and the security of the United States, it has been
frequently unpubl icized, unaccompanied by frenzied charges and
irresponsible threats which might create issues prejudicial to
world peace.

A. Yuri Vasiluevich Novikov

Novikov entered the United States April 24, 19^» as
an attache of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C. He sub-
sequently held the position of second secretary and from 1950
through July, 1952, acted as editor of the official publication
of the Soviet Embassy, the "Information Bulletin. "

- 46 -

On April 12, 1951, Novihov, by meeting a source in
Washington, D, C, was identified as the new Soviet principal
in an espionage operation which had its origin in Austria in
19^9' Novikov, on April 12, 195l> appeared at the designated
place on the proper date, at the designated time and gave the
password previously agreed upon between the source and his
Soviet espionage superiors in Austria.

The original principals in this operation in Austria
were two naturalized citizens, Otto Verber and Kurt L, Ponger,
who were brought back to the United States and upon entering
guilty pleas, xvere, on June 8, 1953> sentenced for violation
of the espionage statute,

Novikov operated the controlled source in the
United States until April 22, 195^* a"d on ten occasions
sought classified material.

On January 14, 1953t Novikov was declared persona
non grata by the Department of State in connection with his
espionage activity. He departed the Uhited States on January 19,
1953-

B. Igor Aleksandrovich Amosov

Amosov entered the Ohited States February I/', 1952,
as Assistant Soviet Naval Attache,

Amosov IMS the third Soviet principal in an intelli-
gence operation directed by the Soviets from their naval
attache's office. He served in this capacity from June 7>
1952, until his departure in February, 195'^" Targets assigned
by Amosov to the controlled source included radar developments,
details of the latest cargo ships, manuals reflecting details
of the latest electronic developments and bombsight data. He
paid the source a total of j^2,000 for his services.

While the operation functioned under Amosov' s control,
he did not accept any material directly from the source, Amosov
furnished instructions to the source in Washington, D, C, and
the material was passed in the New York City area with the
source following a set precedure of obtaining acknowledgement
signals and, thereafter, delivering the material to a designated
drop area, Amosov was declared persona non grata by the State
Department on February J, 195^} as a result of his activities
in this case and he left the United States on February 7y 195^*

- 47 '

C. Aleksandr Petrovich Kovalev

Kovalev arrived in the Vhited States October 8,
19$0, as a second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the
Wiited Nations,

For approximately two years as Assistant Soviet
Naval Attache in Washington, D. C, he had been operating a
controlled source, obtaining from him material of intelligence
significance. On April 19, 195^, the Assistant Soviet Naval
Attache told the source that in the future, material obtained
ujas to be microfilmed and the undeveloped film laas to be
delivered to the Soviets by means of a dead drop located in
the New Fork area rather than through direct delivery to the
Assistant Naval Attache. The source was told to park his car
in a designated area in New York City at a designated time and
to place a package wrapped in red paper therein so that it
could be seen through the rear window in the event material
was to be passed. An additional signal by toay of marking a
telephone directory in a New York restaurant was perfected to
indicate to the source that the material delivered to the dead
drop was picked up.

A trial run of this arrangement occurred in
New York City on April 23, 19$2, on which date Kovalev was
observed in the immediate vicinity of source's car, which was
parked in the designated area and in which was placed a package
wrapped in red paper. Thereafter, the source deposited material
in the dead drop and on April 24, 195^» Kovalev was observed
making the predesignated mark in the telephone directory in
the New York restaurant.

Material of intelligence significance was left by
the controlled source in the New York dead drop area on
October 1 and December 3t 1952, which material was retrieved
by the Soviets. On June 7, ^952, the source was given by his
Soviet principal in Washington §500 to purchase an electronic
device for delivery to the Soviets and an additional $500 in
payment for delivery of a microfilm reproduction of portions of
a manual dealing with an automatic steering device for ships.
The controlled source last heard from his Soviet principal on
April 1, 1953, on which date he was told that a meeting
scheduled for April 3, 1953> would not be held.

- 48

Kovalev loas declared persona non grata by the
Department of State for his actions in this case on
February J, 195^^, and he departed the United States
February 2 0, 19S4.

D» Leonid Igorovich Pivnev

Pivnev entered the United States on Mirch ly,
1950, as Assistant Soviet Air Attache.

On November 2 and J, I9S3> while on a tour
throughout the Southwest, Pivnev purchased aerial maps of
Tulsa, Oklahoma, and vicinity and Dallas, Texas, and vicinity.
Pivnev did not identify himself as a Soviet official when
purchasing these maps.

In the Spring of 1953> through a Washington
businessman, he endeavored to utilize the businessman's address
as a mail drop. He explained to the businessman that he would
have nail delivered to him at the businessman's address, which
mail was to be addressed to a fictitious person and which,
upon receipt, was to be del ivered by the businessman to him.

On March 24, 195^, he inquired at a Virginia aerial
photographic concern as to the possibil ity of purchasing
aerial maps of Chicago, Illinois. He instructed the firm to
seek such maps and agreed to pay approximately ^8,000 for them.
On that date he purchased JJ aerial photographs of Washington,
D. C, and vicinity. Pivnev, in contacting this firm, identi-
fied himself as one "George." He did not indicate his official
connection with the Soviet Embassy.

On May 3, 1954, he contacted a Washington, D, C,
photographer, introducing himself as a Mr. George Tinney, a
representative of a private firm desirous of purchasing aerial
photographs of New York City at a scale of 1:20,000 tol:40,000
feet. Photographs of this type were not commercially available.
On May IJ, 19^4, he agreed to pay the photographer $700 to
obtain the photographs. He advanced on that date the sum of
0400 as partial payment.

On 2iiy 20, 1954, when meeting with the photographer
for the purpose of obtaining the photographs, he was accosted
by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on
which occasion he identified himself. On my 29, 1954, the
Department of State declared Pivnev persona non grata for his
action, and he departed June 6, 1954'

- 49 '

E, M2ksim GriQorievich Martunov

Mxrtynov last entered the United States on
November 3i 195^) as a member of the Soviet Representation
to the Uhited Nations Military Staff Committee,

In August, 195^> '^ highly placed Army officer in
Germany was introduced to a Soviet under clandestine circum-
stances in the Soviet sector of Berlin, The Soviet, aware
of the officer's plan to retire from the Army, asked him to
be of assistance when the Soviet came to the United States,
The officer did not discourage the Soviet's approach and
meetings in New York City were arranged, A code phrase was
established for recognition purposes.

On November 1$, 195^, a Special Agent of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, made up to resemble the Army officer,
was contacted at the agreed time and place in New York City by
Martynov. Prearranged signals were exchanged and they talked
for approximately thirty minutes, Martynov indicated he was a
friend of the Soviet who contacted the officer in Germany and
he asked for the officer's assistance, paying him $2$0, A
subsequent meeting was scheduled for January 1$, 1955'

On that date, Martynov kept the appointment and
with State Department permission, FBI Agents accosted him,
Martynov identified himself and claimed diplomatic immunity.
On February 21, 1955> 'the Department of State declared
Martynov persona non grata for the above activity and he
departed the United States February 26, 1955'

F, Aleksandr Konstantinovich Guri/anov

Guryanov entered the Uhited States March 26, 1955 >
as an employee of the Soviet Delegation to the Uhited Nations,

On April 25, 195^> Guryanov was declared persona non
grata by the [Mi ted States Department of State as a result of
his implication in the improper repatriation ia the USSR of
five Soviet seamen uMo left the Uhited States on April 7> J-95^'
The seamen were members of the crew of the Soviet tanker
"Tuapse" who previously defected to the Uhited States, The
Department of State informed the Soviet Government that
Guryanov's activities made his presence in the Uhited States
no longer desirable and he departed May 9> 195^*

- 50 -

G- Ivan Aleksandrovich Bubchikov

Bubchikov entered the United States December 1,
195^t <3s cin Assistant Soviet Military Attache.

From July, 1955t through Ji£iy, 195^> Bubchikov
Tnaintained contact with a naturalized American citizen of
Russian origin who was employed as a sales engineer. In
July, 1955f ^* appeared at the sales engineer' s residence
late in the evening and sought his cooperation in securing
data concerning Jet fuel, atomic submarines, and aeronautical
developments. Bubchikov promised the engineer large sums of
money; however, even though seemingly important information
was furnished to him, he did not fulfill his promise of
large payments. During the course of this operation it was
featured by clandestine meetings, complex recognition signals,
and a variety of "drop areas" in which the source deposited
material for the Soviet.

In view of his activities in connection v>ith the
engineer, the Department of State, on June 14, 195^> declared
Bubchikov persona non grata for engaging "in espionage
activities incompatible with his continued presence in this
country." He departed the United States June 24, 195^'

H. Boris Fedorovich Gladkov

Gladkov entered the United States December 1$,
^953> ^^ naval advisor to the Soviet Representation in the
Military Staff Committee of the United Nations (UN).

In January, 1955> Gladkov, at a cocktail party,
met a sales engineer for a New York City marine engineering
firm. He cultivated the sales engineer and held a number of
clandestine meetings with him. Through the engineer, on
June 14, 1955} ^^ received two unclassified publications
dealing with marine boilers. During his meetings with the
sales engineer which continued on a regular basis through
June, 1956, Gladkov furnished the engineer ^1,550 for
services rendered.

On June 22, 195^, the Department of State declared
Gladkov persona non grata for engaging in "activities which
were highly improper and incompatible" with his status as a
member of the Soviet Delegation to the UN. He departed
July 12, 1956.

- 51 -

I. Rostislav E. Shapovalov

Shapovalov entered the United States September 2'P,
1955 f as a second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the
IMi ted Motions (UN).

On Miy 7, 14, ly and 21, 195^> Shapovalov con-
tacted a Russian emigre in New York City and urged him to
return to Russia. The emigre, Michael Schatoff, a former
officer in the Russian Army, was a classmate of Shapovalov
at a New York university.

On August 20, 195^> i^^ Department of State declared
Shapovalov persona non grata for his activities in attempting
to induce Schatoff to return to the Soviet Union.

Shapovalov departed the United States September 12,
1956.

J. Viktor Ivanovich Petrov

Viktor Ivanovich Petrov arrived in the
United States February ly, 1953) ^s a translator employed
at the United Nations (UN) Secretariat, New York City.

In December, 1955> ^^ responded to an advertisement
placed in a New York newspaper by an aviation draftsman for
part-time work. The draftsman was an employee of one of our
largest aircraft factories. At the outset, Petrov gave the
draftsman insignificant drafting work, later asking him to
send for various brochures on. aviation. On April 5) 195^'
Petrov requested the draftsman to obtain information concern-
ing United States military aircraft. The information sought
loas classified and, according to the United States Air Force,
would have been a good guide concerning the status of
United States aircraft development.

On August 20, 195^, a representative of the
Department of Justice and the United States Representative
to the UN conferred with the Secretary General of the UN,
who agreed to dismiss Petrov. On August 21, 195^, charges
against Petrov were presented to the Deputy Soviet UN Repre-
sentative and on August 2J, 195^, the UN received a two-line
resignation from Petrov which requested acceptance by
August 2y, 1956' The Secretary General of the UN agreed not
to accept the resignation and to proceed with Petrov' s
dismissal . Petrov hurriedly departed the United States on
August 23, 1956.

- 52 -

K. Konstantin Pavlovich Ekimov

Ehimov entered the Vhited States October 17,
1955t OS second secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the
United Nations (W).

Newspapermen and Immigration and Naturalization
representatives in testimony before the Senate Internal
Security Subcommittee, accused Ekimov of participating in
the abduction of Tanya Chwastov, aged two, an American-
born daughter of a Bussian refugee. It was alleged that
Ekimov participated on October J, 195^, in dockside arrange-
ments enabling Alexei Chwastov to leave the United States
with his infant daughter. This move was against the wishes
of the child's mother who remained in the United States.
Ekimov was declared persona non grata by the Department of
State on October 29, 195^, and he departed the United States
on November JO, 195^.

L. Yuri Pavlovich Krulov

Krylov entered the United States May 4, 1955> "^s
Assistant Soviet Military Attache, Washington, D. C.

In April, 195^1 Krylov was introduced to the
manager of a Washington electronics supply house. Through
the Washingtonian, who cooperated with the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, Krylov purchased hard-to-grt electronic
equipment.

In August of 1955t Krylov contacted an employee
of the Atomic Energy Commission and attempted to obtain from
him information concerning the technical aspects of nuclear
power. In December, 1955i ^* contacted a former commissioner
of the Atomic Energy Commission in an effort to develop
information concerning atomic energy for space heating. In
February, 195^> ^^ attempted to purchase 26 unclassified films
on peace-time atomic energy.

In February, 195^> ^* endeavored to Join the
Society of American Military Engineers and to subscribe to
the publication "The Military Engineer," ichich contained
information concerning United States fortifications.

On January 14, 195? > the Department of State
declared Krylov persona non grata as a result of his
activities. He departed the United States January 26, 1957'

- 53 -

}

M> Vassili Mikhailovich JiibJev

From August, 1944, through January, 1957* M>2ev
served several tours of duty in the Uhited States, occupying
position! of chauffeur and property custodian to the Soviet
Consulate General in New York and property custodian at the
Soviet Embassy, Washington, D, C,

Boris liorros, an admitted Soviet agent cooperating
with^e FBI, was instructed by his Soviet superiors to appear
in the vicinity of $8 West $8th Street, New York City, at
3 p»m, on the first Tuesday of each month for contact by his
Soviet principal. If the contact was not made, Morros was
instructed by the Soviets to return the following Wednesday
and Thur^ay. On Wednesday, January y, 1953> Special Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed Molev in the
vicinity of ^8 West 58th Street, New York City.

Morros was later instructed by his Soviet principal
to meet his Soviet contact on Tuesday, Mzrch J, 1953t on the
corner of Central Park South and Avenue of the Americas,
New York City. On Mxrch J, 19S3* liolev was observed by
Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation con-
summating a meeting with Morros at Central Park South and
Avenue of the Americas. On this occasion Morros passed to
Molev a report previously obtained from Jack Soble, Morros'
immediate superior, uho was subsequently convicted of espionage.
Molev, on Mxrch J, 1953t issued instructions to Morros for a
subsequent meeting; however, that meeting was not effected*

On January 2$, 1957 > Jack Soble, Myra Soble, and
Jacob Albam were arrested on charges of espionage and conspiracy*
Simultaneously, Molev was declared persona non grata because of
his implication in the conspiracy. He departed the United States
January 28, 1957.

N. Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha

Vladimir Arsenevich Grusha was formerly assigned as
first secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Uhited Nations
(UN).

On the night of March 5$ 1957 y Dhanapalo Samarasekara,
a Ceylonese national employed at the UN Secretariat, New York
City, was observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) to enter the Ceylonese Delegation to the UN.

- 54 -

At 7 P'fi. on that date Samaras ehara was observed on the fourth
floor of that building opening what appeared to be a file
cabinet and examining some papers. He was observed to have
left the delegation shortly thereafter carrying an airline-
type handbag. He drove to an area where Vladimir Grusha was
observed standing on a corner. Approximately one ?wur later
Samarasekara was observed to return to the same area where
Grusha was seen getting into Samaras ekara's automobile. After
driving a short distance, Grusha left the car and Samarasekara
returned to the Ceylonese Delegation. He was at that time
observed on the fourth floor of the building where he was
observed opening the same file cabinet he opened earlier in
the evening. He was then observed carefully placing a red
book in the cabinet. He left the delegation shortly thereafter.

It loas subsequently learned that the Ceylonese code
book was red in color and that the code room of the Ceylonese
Delegation was located on the fourth floor of the Ceylonese
Delegation building.

Subsequently interviewed, Samarasekara admitted
going to the Ceylonese Delegation building and later meeting
with Grusha on the night of ISxrch 5t ^957' He denied passing
any information to the Soviet,

Based on information developed by the FBI, the
Department of State declared Grusha persona non grata on
I£Lrch 2$, 1957t <3;nd he departed from the United States on
April 10, 1957' The Department of State instructed the
United States Mission tothe UN to request the Secretary General
of the UN to dismiss Samarasekara from the UN Secretariat,
Samarasekara was advised on July 5> 1957i that he was suspended
with pay, A committee was appointed by the Secretary General
to investigate the allegations against him and on December l6,
1957> the Secretary General informed the United States Mission
to the UN that he had terminated Samaras ekara ' s employment.

0. Gennadi Fedorovich Mashkantsev

Mxshkantsev served as an employee of the Consulate
Division of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. Co, handling
repatriation matters. He arrived in the Ifiiited States
October 2$, 1956.

On March 12, 1957* ^^ appeared at the home of Petr
Pirogov, Russian flyer who, with Anatoli Barsov, defected to
the mi ted States in Austria in 1948. Barsov redefected to

- 55 -

Bussia in 19^9 and, according to Vladimir Petrov, the
former Soviet intelligence officer who defected in Australia,
after lengtly interrogation uxis executed*

Upon visiting Pirogov, Mishkantsev delivered to
him a lengthy handiaritten letter purportedly from Barsov.
The letter petitioned Pirogov to return to the OSSB. Examina-
tion of the letter established that it was not in the hand-
writing of Barsov but was a carefully prepared simulation*
As a result, on April 17, 1957) Mishkantsev was declared
persona non grata for "improper activities directed toward
inducing return to the Soviet [fiiion of persons who have
sought asylum in the United States. " Mishkantsev departed
April 25, 1957-

P. Nikolai Ivanovich Kurochkin

Kurochkin entered the United States, April 4, 195^t
as a third secretary of the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D, C,

In the Fall of 1956, Charles T. Beaumet, a pro-
fessional writer, contacted the Soviet Embassy seeking
statistics as to hosiery production in the Soviet Union. He
met Kurochkin, who supplied the desired statistical data and,
after a series of meetings, informed Beaumet that if he would
obtain military information to be incorporated in articles
Kurochkin was writing for Buss ian military journals, he would
share with him his proceeds from the articles. Thereafter,
Beaumet, utilizing the entree he enjoyed as a reporter,
obtained training and field manuals of the U« So Army vahiph
he turned over to Kurochkin. For the various manuals delivered
to Kurochkin, Beaumet was paid approximately $450„ Included
among the manuals sought by Kurochkin were two which were
classified. The classified manuals were not delivered to
the Soviet.

0?i June 6, 195^> Kurochkin was declared persona
non grata for engaging in highly improper activities
incompatible with his diplomatic status. He departed from
the United States on June 11, 195^'

Q. Kirill Sergeevich Doronkin

Doronkin arrived in the United States March 12,
1956* to serve as Film Editor, Badio and Visual Division
of the Department of Public Information, l^i ted Nations (UN)

-56 -

Secretariat. He returned to the USSR on home leave
April 17, 19S^> <2"^ re-entered the United States July 29,
1956'

In October, 195^> ^ source recruited by the
Soviets obtained aerial photographs of the Chicago area for
delivery to an unknown individual whom he loas instructed to
meet at a prearranged spot in the parking area adjacent to
the railroad station in Soarsdale, New York* On November 1$,
1956} the source arrived at the designated area to keep his
scheduled meeting with the unknoum Soviet. Special Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed Doronkin and his
wife arrive at the parking lot at 6 p.m., November 1$, 195^*
At 6:^$ p.m. Doronkin and his wife left their car and uhile
Doronkin's wife strolled about the immediate area, Doronkin
was seen to talk to the source. The source was observed to
pass to Doronkin a paper-wrapped package which he took from
the trunk of his automobile. Shortly thereafter the source,
Doronkin and his wife re-entered their respective cars and
left the area. The source reported that he turned over to
Doronkin the requested atrial photographs of the Chicago area.

The United States Mission to the UN delivered a
note to the Secretary General of the UN on January 1$, 1959>
requesting Doronkin's dismissal from the UN because of this
activity. Doronkin's contracted term of entployment terminated
jUUrch J, 1959t and he was not re-employed by the UN. He
departed from the United States Itfarch 11, 1959'

R. Evgeni Alekseevioh Zaostrovtsev

Zaostrovtsev entered the United States August 2,
1957> °s "3 second secretary of the Soviet Embassy, JfHshington,
D. C.

On February 2J, 1958> Zaostrovtsev met a State
Department foreign service officer in training, at a social
function. There followed intensive efforts on the part of
Zaostrovtsev to cultivate the State Department employee for
intelligence purposes. Between February, 195^* a"<^ February:^,
1959f he met with the State Department employee on 1$
occasions. He obtained from the State Department employee
material concerning the training program of foreign service
officers and endeavored, without success, to obtain classified
documents from State Department files concerning the political
and economic affairs in the area of the GovernniBnt employee's
future foreign assignment. He paid the Government employee
fl50 for information furnished to him.

- 57 -

A3 a result of his dealings with the State
Department employee, the Department of State on Mzy IJt
19$9t made an informal request of the Soviet Embassy for
Zaostrovtsev's recall. Zaostrovtsev departed the
United States on Miy 1$, 1959-

S. Vadim Aleksandrovich Kirilxjuk

Kirilyuk arrived in the United States September 11,
195S> as a political affairs officer enq)loyed by the
Department of Trusteeship and Information from Non-Self
Governing Territories, United Nations (UN) Secretariat* In
April, 1959> <3n American citizen contacted a Soviet official
in Mexico City concetning the possibility of obtaining a
Soviet university scholarship. The Soviet obtained complete
background information from the American, including the facts
concerning his previous assignment in cryptographic machines
and systems while serving in the Uhited States Army* following
his return to the United States, the American was contacted
by Kirilyuk, who identified himself as one "George."

During the period from June through September, 1959 1
Kirilyuk met with the American in a clandestine manner on five
occasions. On these occasions he requested data concerning
cryptographic machines and instructed the American to seek
employment with a vital Uhited States Government agency,
Kirilyuk's meetings with the source on August 28, 1959* ond
on September l8, 1959> were observed by Special Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

The Secretary General of the UN was informed of
Kirilyuk's espionage activity on December I/', 1959* On
January 7) 19^0, the Soviet Delegation to the UN was advised
of Kirilyuk's activities, whereupon Kirilyuk and his family
left the Ifiiited States on January 10, I96O.

58 -

Ill, INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF 307IET SSPIONAOS
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES

Espionage , by its very nature, ia international -
the attempt by one oountry to obtain the aeorets of another.
Frequently a third country, beoauae of its neutrality or
atrategic acceaaibility, ia uaed aa a baae for auch operationa,
its citigena, often having privilegea aa alliea of the target
country, recruited aa agenta. The Soviet Union, now critical
of American uae of overaeaa baaea, haa for many yeara directed
espionage operationa againat the United Statea through other
countries. Petr Derjabin, Soviet intelligence officer who
defected in Auatria in 1954, atated that in December, 1951,
when Lieutenant General Sergei R. Savchenlso became Chief of
the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence Service), he iaaued
ordera that it would be neceaaary to intensify operationa
against the United States from beyond our borders. His
instructions have been carried out,

A, Dr, Alan Nunn Uav

Dr. Alan Nunn Hay waa born in Birmingham, England,
in 1911, In 1943 he was sent to Canada with a group of
prominent British nuclear phyaioiata to worlf on the atomic
bomb project for the Canadian Department of Scientific and
Industrial Research.

Igor Gouaenko, Soviet code clerk who defected in
Canada September 5, 1945, described May as one of the most
important Soviet agents under Colonel Nikolai Zabotin, Soviet
Military Attache and chief of Soviet Military Intelligence
operationa in Canada, Dr, May furnished Zabotin's organi-
sation with voluminous, vitally important information concern-
ing atomic fusion, including specimens of uranium 833 and
uranium 835, Gousenko stated that May had been in the pay
of the Soviet Union for many years and had been a secret
member of the Communist Party of Great Britain,

Immediately after the bombing of Hiroshima in
August, 1945, Zabotin wired to Moscow certain iryformation
received from May, forwarded a report by May setting forth
production figurea and furnished a amall quantity of
uranium 833, May had access to uranium 833 in connection
with his work in Canada but did not have access to
uranium 835 which may have been obtained when he visited

- 59 -

the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago in
September and October, 1944-, Miy also furnished to the
Russians information concerning the proximity fuse.

Mxy returned to the United Kingdom in September,
19^5t ond in February, 19^6, was arrested by British authori-
ties in London and charged with violation of the Official
Secrets Act, Subsequently, on a plea of guilty, Miy was
sentenced to serve 10 years in a British penitentiary,

B. Sam Carr

From information furnished by Igor Gouzenko, together
with documents which he abstracted from the Soviet Embassy in
Canada, it was established that Sam Carr was one of the most
important espionage agents operated by the Soviet Military
Intell igence Service in Canada during 19^2-194-$. Sam Carr,
born as Schmil Kogan July ^, 1906, at Kharkov, Russia, was
naturalized as a Canadian citizen in 1931* An old communist
of international reputation, he had long been active in
illegal and intelligence work.

In Mxrch, 1946, following the defection of Igor
Gouzenko, Carr suddenly disappeared from Canada, fleeing
behind the Iron Curtain. Having altered his appearance
and assumed a new name and identity, Carr surreptitiously
entered the Uhited States in the Fall of 19^8 and in January,
1949> was apprehended by the FBI in New York City. Carr was
returned to Canada and on April 8, 1949* "ws convicted in
Ottawa of conspiracy to violate Canadian law in the procure-
ment of a fraudulent passport. He was sentenced to six years
in prison.

C. Ignacu Samuel Witczak

One of the individuals for whom Sam Carr was
instructed to obtain false documentation was a Soviet agent
using the assumed name of Ignacy Sarmiel Witczak. According
to Igor Gouzenko, Moscow had instructed the Soviet Military
Attache of Ottawa in August, 194-5} to obtain a Canadian
passport for a Soviet agent then in Los Angeles, California,
under the name of Witczak. Gouzenko stated that the latter's
function in the United States was to operate a network of
Soviet agents in the event of a break in United States-
Soviet diplomatic relations. However, the FBI established
that Witczak was engaged in recruiting individuals in the

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United States for intelligence assignments in the Orient
and South America. The persons recruited were given funds,
passage, and i?istr-uctions for establishing contact with other
Soviet agents upon reaching their destination.

The Soviet agent posing as Witczak had assumed the
name and identity of a real Ignacy Samuel Witczak, a Polish-
bom naturalized citizen of Canada who had served with the
Loyalists in Spain and had surrendered his Canadian passport
upon arrival in that coimtry in 1937' Using this passport, the
false Witczak, a Soviet illegal agent, had arrived in the
United States the following year.

In New York City in 194$, Witczak, the impostor, was
in contact with Leonid S. Ualov, clerk of the Soviet Consulate,
who was clearly implicated in Soviet espionage operations and
in November, 194$, was also in contact with Lieutenant Nikolai G.
Red in who loas brought to trial the following year on charges
of espionage. In California the false Witczak was in contact
with Mikhail F. iAikhachev, Assistant to the Soviet Vice-Ccnsul
in Los Angeles and a reported Soviet intelligence agent.

The Soviet agent posing as Ignacy Samuel Witczak
disappeared November 21, 194$. uis most intimate associate in
the United States was Clarence H. Vetterli, whom Witczak had
used in making contact with potential recruits. On the basis
of denials, before a Federal Grand Jury in Los Angeles, of
participation in Witczak's intelligence operations, Vetterli
was convicted July 12, 19$1, on charges of perjury and on
July 2$, 19$1, was sentenced to a total of sijc years imprison-

\ ment,

I

D. Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs

Forced to flee his native land in 1933* ^H Julius
, Klaus Fuchs, German-bom nuclear physicist^ sought refuge in
i Great Britain. In 1941, having received the greater portion
I of his higher education in Great Britain, Fuchs was entrusted
: with research work on atomic energy. Almost immediately

he sought out Soviet agents to whom he could and did give

secret information to which he had access.

\ In December, 1943, Fuctis arrived in the United States

I as a member of a group of British scientists selected to carry
on further atomic research in coordination with that of this
country. Before leaving Britain, Fucfis had perfected arrange-
ments to continue his espionage operations. As a result of

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such arrangements, relayed through Moscow, Fuchs was placed
in contact with Barry Gold who was in contact with Anatoli A,
Yakovlev, clerk of the Soviet Consulate in New Fork City,
From early 1944 through September, 19^5, Fuchs worked with
Manhattan Engineer District in New York and at the Los Alamos
Laboratory in New Mexico, during which time he repeatedly
transmitted secret atomic energy information to Yakovlev
through Harry Gold, Upon returning to England in June, 19^>
Fuchs continued to supply his Soviet superiors with secret
infOTTnation concerning atomic research until 19^9* Interrogated
by British authorities, on January 27, 1950, Fuchs confessed
to his operations on behalf of the Soviet Ifiiion,

On March 1, 1950, Fuchs entered a plea of guilty
in England to charges of violating the Official Secrets Act
and was sentenced to 14 years in prison,

E, Pontecorvo, Burgess and Maclean

In September, 1950, several months after the arrest
of atomic spy Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs, an outstanding British
scientist. Dr. Bruno Fontecorvo, disappeared behind the Iron
Curtain, Thirty-seven years of age at the time, Pontecorvo
was a naturalized British subject of Italian birth. He had
worked with Enrico Fermi in Home, Italy, until 193^ when he
went to Paris, France, to escape religious persecution under
the fascist regime. In Paris, he worked with Frederic Joliot-
Curie, leading French nuclear physicist and admitted communist,
Pontecorvo fled from France following the invasion by Nazi
forces in 1940, One of the scientists responsible for the
development of the Neutron Theory, subsequently applied in
the creation of the atomic bomb, he arrived in the Ohited States
in August, 1940, Here he was employed by a private concern in
the location of oil deposits but later engaged in atomic energy
experiments and cosmic ray research for the British Government
in Canada and at the time of his disappearance was employed at
the British atomic establishment located at Harwell, England,
In 1955 ii '^oas reported that Pontecorvo, then in Moscow, US£R,
where he was working on Soviet atomic projects, claimed that
he had left the "capitalist world" because of preparations
being made for the use of atomic energy for military purposes.

On May 25» 195-^> ^w British diplomats, Guy Francis
DeMoncy Burgess and Donald Duart Maclean, also disappeared,
Maclean had been assigned as a member at the British Embassy,
Washington, D, C, from May, 1944, until September, 1948,

62 -

Burgess served in a similar capacity in the Ifi^ited States
from August, 1950, until his recall in May, 1951' I'n
February, 195^ t they handed a prepared statement to members
of the press in Moscow, OSSR, in which both admitted having
been communists at college and stated that Burgess arranged
for their escape inasmuch as Maclean was under surveillance,
Vladimir M, Petrov, Soviet intelligence officer who defected
in Australia in 195^t stated that he had learned from a
colleague that the flight of Burgess and Maclean, both
long-term Soviet agents, had been planned from Moscow,

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■cA\

X

Free Library of Philadelphia

351.74 Un3e

United States.

Exposbe of Soviet espionage, M

3 2222 03113 5645

^1~ 32269

STACIf

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